Executive–Legislative Relations in Hybrid Regimes: Institutional Interaction and Power Politics in Pakistan

Abstract

In hybrid regimes, executive–legislative relations are rarely defined solely by constitutional provisions; instead, they are shaped by political bargaining, informal practices, and uneven power structures. Pakistan presents a compelling case where elected institutions coexist with strong non-elected actors, resulting in persistent tensions between democratic ideals and political realities. This study examines the interaction between the executive and legislature in Pakistan, with a focus on law-making, accountability, and instances of cooperation and conflict. The paper argues that executives often dominate the legislative arena through party discipline, ordinances, and informal influence, limiting parliamentary autonomy. At the same time, the legislature is not entirely passive; periods of assertiveness emerge when political consensus and public pressure align. By analyzing these shifting dynamics, the study highlights how institutional interaction in Pakistan reflects broader patterns common to hybrid regimes, where formal democratic structures coexist with power-driven politics. The findings suggest that executive–legislative relations in Pakistan remain fluid and contested, shaped by both institutional design and political power struggles. This case contributes to a deeper understanding of governance in hybrid regimes and the challenges facing democratic consolidation.