Corporate Social Responsibility and Investment Efficiency: Unraveling the Mediating Mechanisms of Information Asymmetry and Agency Costs

Abstract

This study examines the relationship between Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and investment efficiency within the institutional framework of an emerging market, with a focus on the mediating roles of information asymmetry and agency costs. Using a balanced panel of 115 non-financial firms listed on the Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) from 2016 to 2024, the analysis employs fixed-effects regression models to control for unobserved heterogeneity and ensure robust inference. The results reveal a statistically significant negative association between CSR disclosure and investment inefficiency, indicating that firms with higher CSR engagement tend to allocate capital more efficiently, avoiding both overinvestment and underinvestment. This suggests that CSR functions not only as a reputational tool but as a governance mechanism that enhances transparency, strengthens stakeholder accountability, and aligns managerial incentives with long-term value creation. Further analysis confirms a dual mediating pathway: information asymmetry mediates the relationship between CSR and underinvestment, as improved CSR disclosure reduces informational opacity and facilitates better access to external financing. Meanwhile, agency costs proxies by free cash flow mediate the link between CSR and overinvestment, supporting Jensen’s (1986) hypothesis that excess internal funds invite managerial opportunism. CSR mitigates this risk by institutionalizing ethical accountability and constraining discretionary spending. These findings provide empirical evidence on the governance channels through which CSR influences core financial decisions, highlighting its strategic role in promoting financial resilience and efficient resource allocation particularly in institutional environments marked by weak monitoring and high information frictions.