The Limits of Presidential Power: Executive Orders, Separation of Powers, and Constitutional Accountability in the United States
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.63056/academia.4.6.2025.2527Keywords:
executive orders, presidential power, separation of powers, judicial review, constitutional accountability, unilateral action, presidential immunityAbstract
A constitutional text does little to tell us much about executive orders, which have become one of the most significant forms of American government. It poses the question of how far can presidential powers reach by executive order go without violating the separation of powers and what are the institutions for checking the president in practice? The study relies on a doctrinal analysis of selected Supreme Court decisions and a descriptive analysis of the issuance of executive orders from Franklin D. Roosevelt to Joseph R. Biden Jr., and concludes that formal constitutional constraints are real but uneven. The best time to rein in the president is when a command is clearly in conflict with legislation or encroaches on the legislative realm. By contrast, the informal constraints imposed by Congress (and political ones, to a lesser degree) are strong strains in unified government. The recent expansion of presidential immunity for official acts complicates the picture further because it makes the personal legal accountability for overreach narrower, yet it does not affect structural checks, and makes them more difficult to trigger. The article ends in saying that accountability is more a matter of the interplay between different branches than of any one branch, and that reforms are needed to recover the ability of each branch to do their job.
Downloads
Published
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2025 Syed Abbas Ali Shah (Author)

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.























