Hybrid Democracy in Pakistan: Civil-Military Relations, Constitutional Amendments, and the Struggle for Institutional Autonomy

Abstract

Pakistan's democratic process has always been a mixture of civilian elected governments and deep-rooted military influence on political decision making, which has been dubbed as a hybrid democracy (Levitsky & Way, 2010; Croissant et al., 2013). Even after multiple constitutional amendments, transition to democracy and judicial interventions, there remains a gap between civilian supremacy and military autonomy and institutional governance in the political trajectory of Pakistan. The literature on military interventions and democratic transitions has focused on the effects of these interventions on the autonomy and democracy of institutions, but the literature has been comparatively little on the interaction between constitutional amendments and civil-military relations, and how this affects the autonomy of constitutional institutions in the hybrid political order in Pakistan (Shah, 2014; Rizvi, 2000). To fill this void, this study has critically analyzed the link between the civil-military relations, constitutional changes and democratic governance in Pakistan. The study takes the interpretivist qualitative research design because it has the research questions: How constitutional amendment has impacted the balance of power between civil institutions and military institutions and to what extent these constitutional amendments have enhanced or curtailed the institutional autonomy? It uses doctrinal constitutional analysis and qualitative document analysis of constitutional amendments, judicial decisions, parliamentary debates and official reports, as well as the analysis of peer-reviewed academic publications. Theories used for the analysis include those of new institutionalism (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004), civil-military relations (Stepan, 1988), and hybrid regimes (Huntington, 1957). The results indicate that constitutional reforms have helped make significant strides toward democratic reforms, including increasing parliamentary oversight and strengthening provincial autonomy, but the extent of the implementation has been limited by persistent informal power structures and institutional inequalities as well as recurring civil-military power dynamics. The study contends that the hybrid democracy in Pakistan is not only more than a constitutional design, but it is also maintained through the engagement of formal institutional frameworks and informal political processes. This research combines aspects of constitutional law and comparative politics and civil-military relations, thus enriching the existing literature on democratic consolidation, institutional autonomy and hybrid governance. The results highlight the need of enhancing constitutional accountability, strengthening institutional checks and balances, independence of judiciary and democratic control in order to achieve sustainable constitutional governance and democratic stability in Pakistan.