Reasons Weak Enforceability of International Law with Case Studies

Abstract

The international legal system, which is meant to regulate the relations between independent states, is subject to the constant doubts concerning the ability of the international law to enforce compliance. The international norms are not based on the centralized enforcement as is common with domestic systems, but on the voluntary involvement of states, decentralized application, and collective actions that usually involve power asymmetry and political goals. This paper discusses the structural factors that lead to a weak enforcement, such as lack of centralized enforcement authority, primacy of state sovereignty, unequal enforcement between powerful and weaker states and fragmentation of enforcement mechanisms, and discusses how they undermine the perceived effectiveness of international law. The analysis of theoretical solutions and practical examples (such as the 2022-2021 conflict in Ukraine, the arbitration process in South China Sea, and the work of the UN peacekeeping missions) will show that the use of power politics and institutional limitations do not allow achieving complete enforcement but the normative role of law that regulates the behavior of states will continue to function. The analysis examines other compliance instruments, including positive incentives, targeted countermeasures, and legal deterrence of the gray-zone behavior, and maps out the reform directions, including procedural changes to decision-blocking in the global security organizations, increased financial incentives, and better monitoring technologies. Using more than 100 sources (academic, policy, and official documents), the paper concludes that pragmatic institutional reforms and enforcement gaps should not be expected to get better, although the latter remains possible.