

Theologically Motivated Territorial Revisionism: Religion, Institutions, and the Failure of Deterrent Logic in Territorial Conflict

Dr. Noor Saeed Khan

noorsaheed@numl.edu.pk

Lecturer, Department of International Relations, NUML, Islamabad, Pakistan

Dr. Muzaffar Khan Zafar

muzaffarkhan@numl.edu.pk

Visiting Assistant Professor, Department of International Relations, NUML, Islamabad, Pakistan

Corresponding Author: Dr. Noor Saeed Khan noorsaheed@numl.edu.pk

Received: 16-10-2025

Revised: 07-11-2025

Accepted: 02-12-2025

Published: 21-12-2025

ABSTRACT

In July 2024 the International Court of Justice found Israel's continued presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory unlawful and held that all new settlement activity must cease immediately. Settlement authorisation continued. Standard explanations for this non-response — the non-binding character of advisory opinions and the asymmetry of enforcement capacity — account for why compliance was not compelled but not for why adjustment was not chosen, since states routinely modify behaviour under reputational and legal pressure that falls well short of compulsion. This article proposes Theologically Motivated Territorial Revisionism (TMTR) to explain that residual. The framework holds that where a territorial claim is theologically formulated and institutionally embedded within the machinery of government, the cost-benefit ledger on which legal and diplomatic pressure operates does not contain the term that pressure is designed to move. TMTR is deliberately constructed as a claim about institutions rather than about belief: it does not require that any office-holder be sincere, only that theological claims have been converted into constraints that bind regardless of sincerity. The framework is differentiated from five adjacent concepts — conventional revisionism, constructed indivisibility, sacred-space theory, religious nationalism, and settler colonialism — with the constructivist account of indivisibility treated as the principal rival. Scope conditions and falsification criteria are specified, the framework is applied illustratively to Israeli territorial policy since 1967, and a comparative probe considers Hindu nationalist claims in Jammu and Kashmir.

Keywords: territorial conflict; religion and international relations; indivisibility; international law; revisionism; Israel–Palestine

INTRODUCTION: A PUZZLE OF NON-RESPONSE

On 19 July 2024 the International Court of Justice delivered the most authoritative legal determination available to the international system on a territorial question. The Court held that Israel's continued presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory was unlawful, that the obligation to cease all new settlement activity was immediate, and that third states were under a duty not to recognise as lawful the situation arising from that presence.¹ Settlement authorisation continued. So did the wider policy programme the opinion addressed.

¹International Court of Justice, *Legal Consequences Arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Including East Jerusalem*, Advisory Opinion of 19 July 2024, I.C.J. Reports 2024, para. 285.

The discipline has two ready answers, and both are correct as far as they go. Advisory opinions are not binding in the manner of contentious judgments. Enforcement in this arena is structurally obstructed by the composition of the Security Council, a constraint the Council itself acknowledged when it last legislated on the question.² Yet neither answer disposes of the puzzle. Both explain why compliance was not *compelled*. Neither explains why adjustment was not *chosen*. States frequently modify territorial and security behaviour under legal and reputational pressure well short of compulsion, precisely because the accumulated costs of non-adjustment eventually register in the calculations that govern policy. The question this article addresses is why, in this instance, they appear not to register at all.

The answer proposed here is that the ledger on which such pressure operates does not contain the relevant term. Where a territorial claim is theologically formulated and institutionally embedded, the value assigned to the territory is not denominated in the currency in which sanction, condemnation, and legal determination are paid. Raising the cost of holding land does not lower the value of divine obligation, because the two quantities are incommensurable. Deterrent logic can make retention expensive; it cannot make retention optional.

This article develops that claim as a mid-range framework, Theologically Motivated Territorial Revisionism (TMTR), and specifies it precisely enough to be tested and, if wrong, discarded. Two features of the construction warrant emphasis at the outset. First, TMTR is a claim about *institutions*, not about belief. It does not require that any office-holder sincerely hold the theological commitments invoked, and it is indifferent to the sincerity question. What it requires is that theological claims have been converted into institutional constraints — constitutional provision, coalition veto point, budgetary allocation, bureaucratic appointment — that bind policy regardless of who occupies office and regardless of what they privately believe. This move relocates the framework from the inaccessible terrain of motive to the observable terrain of institutional design, and it is what makes TMTR falsifiable.

Second, TMTR is narrower than the literatures adjacent to it, and its value lies in that narrowness. It does not purport to explain religious conflict, religious nationalism, or territorial dispute in general. It addresses the specific configuration in which a theologically grounded claim to defined territory has been institutionally entrenched, and it makes a specific prediction about what follows: that international pressure calibrated to cost-benefit reasoning will fail, and will fail in a patterned rather than a random way.

The article proceeds in seven further sections. Section 2 examines five existing frameworks and identifies precisely where each stops. Section 3 develops TMTR through its three constitutive pillars. Section 4 specifies scope conditions and the evidence that would falsify the framework. Section 5 applies it illustratively to Israeli territorial policy since 1967. Section 6 offers a comparative probe on Jammu and Kashmir. Section 7 draws out implications for theory and for the design of international response. Section 8 concludes.

What Existing Frameworks Explain, and Where They Stop

The claim to originality advanced here is bounded, and establishing it requires showing not that the existing literature has ignored religion and territory — it manifestly has not — but that the mechanism connecting theological claim to institutional constraint to international non-response has not been specified. Five bodies of work bear directly on the problem.

²United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2334, S/RES/2334, 23 December 2016, operative para. 1.

Conventional revisionism

Gilpin located revisionism in the disequilibrium between the distribution of power and the distribution of prestige and governing rules, and treated the revisionist state as one seeking to bring the second into line with the first.³ Schweller established that neorealism carries an unacknowledged status-quo bias which obscures genuinely revisionist motives and renders the discipline poorly equipped to distinguish between states that are dissatisfied and states that are merely insecure.⁴ Goertz and Diehl demonstrated empirically that territorial disputes are the most persistent category of interstate conflict.⁵

The limitation for present purposes is structural rather than empirical. Conventional revisionism is, in principle, deterrable. Its logic is one of cost and benefit, and rising costs can in principle reverse expansion; this is what makes the offensive-realist expectation of expansion-to-the-limits-of-capability coherent as a prediction rather than a tautology.⁶ TMTR concerns the case where that reversibility fails, and fails for reasons internal to how the claim is constituted rather than because the costs imposed were insufficient.

Constructed indivisibility

The most serious rival account is Goddard's. She argues that territorial indivisibility is neither inherent in territory nor reducible to psychological attachment, but is produced through the legitimization strategies actors adopt during bargaining. Legitimizations resonate differentially across audiences; some build ties between coalitions and preserve the mutual recognisability of claims, while others lock actors into positions from which the opponent's claim can no longer be acknowledged as legitimate.⁷ Indivisibility, on this account, is an outcome of political process rather than a property of land.

This is powerful, and TMTR does not contest it. The framework proposed here accepts that theological claims to territory are constructed and that their construction is traceable. The disagreement concerns what happens next. Goddard's account, because it locates indivisibility in legitimization strategy, implies at least the theoretical possibility of reconstruction: what strategic legitimization built, revised legitimization might dismantle. TMTR specifies the conditions under which that reversal becomes prohibitively costly. Once a theologically framed claim has been written into constitutional provision, secured by coalition veto points, capitalised through infrastructural expenditure, and staffed through bureaucratic appointment, the actors who would have to perform the reconstruction are the actors whose institutional position depends on the claim standing. The construction acquires a defensive constituency. TMTR is thus best read not as a rejection of the constructivist account of indivisibility but as a specification of its stickiness — an account of when constructed indivisibility becomes institutionally locked. The mechanism is the one Pierson identifies as increasing returns: once a path is established, the actors who have organised their expectations and investments around it constitute a constituency for its continuation, and the cost of reversal rises over

³Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), chap. 1.

⁴Randall L. Schweller, "Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?" *Security Studies* 5, no. 3 (1996): 90–121.

⁵Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl, *Territorial Changes and International Conflict* (London: Routledge, 1992).

⁶John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), chap. 2.

⁷Stacie E. Goddard, "Uncommon Ground: Indivisible Territory and the Politics of Legitimacy," *International Organization* 60, no. 1 (2006): 35–68.

time not because the arrangement cannot be undone but because the system that has adapted to it cannot cheaply reorganise.⁸

Shelef poses the challenge from the opposite direction and is the more demanding interlocutor. Drawing on comparable data across Germany, Italy, and Palestine, he shows that homelands are not fixed but change over time, and that the change is driven by domestic political competition; territories once held to be constitutive of the nation are in a range of cases quietly relinquished.⁹ If homeland claims shift under domestic competition, any account asserting the durability of a particular claim owes an explanation of why competition has not dislodged it. The answer proposed here is that Shelef identifies the general mechanism correctly and that institutional embedding is what suspends it: where the actors advancing the claim occupy veto positions within the governing coalition, domestic competition cannot perform the work he attributes to it, because the competitive process has itself been structurally insulated. TMTR is on this reading a specification of the conditions under which Shelef's mechanism fails to operate.

Sacred space

Hassner established that conflicts over sacred sites exhibit dynamics categorically distinct from disputes over secular territory, because such sites combine religious centrality with genuine indivisibility, and because side payments cannot compensate for what cannot be divided.¹⁰ His subsequent monograph developed the argument through the analytical categories of vulnerability and centrality, and demonstrated that reconfiguration of sacred space, while rare, is possible where political will, religious authority, and opportunity coincide.¹¹

TMTR builds directly on this foundation and departs from it in scale. Hassner's object is the site: a shrine, a mount, a tomb, bounded and identifiable. The framework proposed here addresses national territorial policy, in which an entire administered territory is treated in the register Hassner identifies for sacred sites. The extension is not automatic. A theory of why a specific holy place resists partition does not by itself explain why a government treats several thousand square kilometres as similarly indivisible, and the mechanism by which the sacral register is extended from site to territory is precisely what requires specification.

Religious nationalism

The turn against the secularisation premise in International Relations is now well established. Philpott showed that the marginality of religion in the discipline followed from the secularised authority structure of the international system rather than from any finding about religion's political weight, and that the resurgence of public religion challenged several planks of that settlement.¹² His earlier monograph had

⁸Paul Pierson, "Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics," *American Political Science Review* 94, no. 2 (2000): 251–67.

⁹Nadav G. Shelef, *Homelands: Shifting Borders and Territorial Disputes* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2020).

¹⁰Ron E. Hassner, "To Halve and to Hold: Conflicts over Sacred Space and the Problem of Indivisibility," *Security Studies* 12, no. 4 (2003): 1–33.

¹¹Ron E. Hassner, *War on Sacred Grounds* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009), chap. 1.

¹²Daniel Philpott, "The Challenge of September 11 to Secularism in International Relations," *World Politics* 55, no. 1 (2002): 66–95.

already traced the constitutive role of religious ideas in the formation of the sovereign order itself.¹³ Fox identified religion as an overlooked element of the field and subsequently demonstrated across large-N data that religious salience raises both the incidence and the duration of conflict.¹⁴ Berger's edited collection marked the decisive scholarly reversal on secularisation,¹⁵ Hurd showed that secularism itself functions as a contestable political settlement rather than a neutral baseline,¹⁶ and Sandal and Fox undertook the first systematic assessment of religion's place across the discipline's major theoretical strands.¹⁷

On the relation between religion and nationalism specifically, Juergensmeyer framed the confrontation between religious nationalism and the secular state as a global phenomenon,¹⁸ and Brubaker set out four analytically distinct approaches, culminating in the possibility of a distinctively religious form of nationalism.¹⁹ That the discipline has registered the shift is no longer in question.²⁰

What this literature supplies is warrant for taking religion seriously as a variable. What it does not supply is a specified mechanism linking a theological territorial claim to a policy output that resists external pressure. Religious nationalism is a category of mobilisation; TMTR addresses a subset of it defined by territorial specificity and institutional entrenchment. The narrowing is deliberate: a framework that covers less can predict more.

Settler colonialism

Wolfe identified the elimination of the native as the organising logic of settler societies and insisted that invasion is a structure rather than an event, a formulation that has shaped a generation of subsequent work.²¹ Veracini developed the insight into a comparative typology of settler formations.²²

TMTR operates at a different level of analysis and answers a different question. Settler-colonial theory explains structural outcomes for indigenous populations over time. TMTR explains the ideological and

¹³Daniel Philpott, *Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), chap. 1.

¹⁴Jonathan Fox, "Religion as an Overlooked Element of International Relations," *International Studies Review* 3, no. 3 (2001): 53–73; and Fox, *Religion, Civilization, and Civil War: 1945 Through the New Millennium* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2004).

¹⁵Peter L. Berger, ed., *The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999).

¹⁶Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, *The Politics of Secularism in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).

¹⁷Nukhet A. Sandal and Jonathan Fox, *Religion in International Relations Theory: Interactions and Possibilities* (London: Routledge, 2013). See also Fabio Petito and Pavlos Hatzopoulos, eds., *Religion in International Relations: The Return from Exile* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).

¹⁸Mark Juergensmeyer, *The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).

¹⁹Rogers Brubaker, "Religion and Nationalism: Four Approaches," *Nations and Nationalism* 18, no. 1 (2012): 2–20.

²⁰Kenneth D. Wald and Clyde Wilcox, "Getting Religion: Has Political Science Rediscovered the Faith Factor?" *American Political Science Review* 100, no. 4 (2006): 523–29.

²¹Patrick Wolfe, "Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native," *Journal of Genocide Research* 8, no. 4 (2006): 387–409.

²²Lorenzo Veracini, *Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), chap. 1.

institutional pathway by which a governing coalition arrives at, and then cannot depart from, a territorial commitment. The two are complementary; neither substitutes for the other. A researcher asking what settlement does to those displaced by it is asking Wolfe's question. A researcher asking why international pressure fails to alter the policy is asking the question posed here.

RATIONALIST BARGAINING AND THE COMMITMENT PROBLEM

A framework invoking indivisibility must answer the rationalist objection, which is the most serious methodological challenge it faces. Fearon argued that issue indivisibility is rarely a binding constraint, since most goods can be rendered divisible through side payments, issue linkage, or randomised allocation; the puzzle of war is therefore why states fight when an efficient bargain almost always exists in principle.²³ Powell subsequently reformulated much of what had been attributed to indivisibility as commitment problems arising from anticipated shifts in the distribution of power: the difficulty is not that the good cannot be divided but that no party can credibly promise to honour a division tomorrow.²⁴

TMTR does not require the strong claim that theologically framed territory is metaphysically indivisible, and it is better served by declining it. The framework advances a weaker and more tractable proposition: that institutional embedding removes the domestic actors capable of making and enforcing a divisible bargain. A government whose parliamentary survival depends on parties holding non-negotiable territorial commitments cannot credibly commit to a territorial concession, not because the territory resists division but because execution of the concession would dissolve the government undertaking it. The apparent indivisibility of preferences is, on this reading, a commitment problem of a specific type, with its source located in domestic institutional design rather than in shifting international power.

This reformulation is deliberate and has two advantages. It renders TMTR legible within the rationalist idiom rather than dismissible by it, since the mechanism proposed is one bargaining theorists already recognise. And it identifies the variable that would have to change for a bargain to become available: not the intensity of belief, which is not amenable to external influence, but the institutional configuration through which belief has been converted into a veto. The framework thereby specifies where the constraint actually sits.

THEOLOGICALLY MOTIVATED TERRITORIAL REVISIONISM

Definition

Theologically Motivated Territorial Revisionism denotes a configuration in which (i) a claim to defined territory is formulated in terms of religious obligation rather than strategic or economic interest; (ii) that claim has been institutionally embedded within the machinery of the state such that it constrains policy independently of the preferences of individual office-holders; and (iii) the resulting policy exhibits systematic non-response to international pressure calibrated to cost-benefit reasoning. All three conditions are necessary. A theologically framed claim that has not been institutionally embedded is rhetoric. An entrenched territorial commitment that is strategically rather than theologically justified is conventional revisionism. Non-response in the absence of the first two conditions requires a different explanation altogether.

²³James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," *International Organization* 49, no. 3 (1995): 379–414.

²⁴Robert Powell, "War as a Commitment Problem," *International Organization* 60, no. 1 (2006): 169–203.

The framework is operationalised through three pillars, each measurable from the public record.

Theological Intensity of Territorial Claims (TITC)

TITC measures the degree to which territorial claims are theologically formulated, institutionally registered, and politically activated within a governing ideology. It is a variable, not a binary. At low values, governments invoke religious symbolism while justifying territorial policy on other grounds; the symbolism decorates a claim that does not depend on it. At high values, specified territory is treated as the object of religious obligation, and the vocabulary of obligation appears not merely in speeches but in the legislative and coalition record.

The distinction matters because it separates TMTR from the far larger class of cases in which political actors deploy religious language instrumentally. The indicators are correspondingly institutional rather than rhetorical: the presence of theological formulations in constitutional or basic-law provision; the appearance of territorial commitments framed in religious terms within coalition agreements, which are negotiated documents rather than public performances; and the platforms of parties whose participation in government is conditional on those commitments. In the Israeli case the theological tradition supplying the vocabulary has been traced in detail, and its transformation from a marginal current into a governing one is itself a documented process.²⁵

State–Religion Nexus (SRN)

SRN identifies the institutional mechanisms through which theological claims are converted into operational policy, and it is the pillar that carries the framework’s distinctive weight. Lustick’s study of Jewish fundamentalism in Israel remains the foundational treatment and supplies the essential insight: religious-nationalist movements secure durable policy influence less through formal constitutional entrenchment than through a combination of coalition leverage, administrative penetration, and success in relocating the boundaries of legitimate political debate — what he termed heresthetic rather than rhetorical success.²⁶

Four mechanisms are specified. Coalition leverage operates where a party holding theological territorial commitments occupies a pivotal position, such that the government’s survival is conditional on those commitments not being traded. This is Tsebelis’s veto-player logic applied to territorial policy: policy stability rises with the number of veto players and the ideological distance between them, and a coalition partner whose defining commitment is territorial constitutes a veto player on precisely the dimension at issue.²⁷ Bureaucratic penetration operates where the administrative apparatus governing the territory is staffed by, or responsive to, the movement holding those commitments, so that implementation proceeds irrespective of ministerial direction. Weizman’s analysis of the spatial and administrative organisation of the occupation shows how completely planning, infrastructure, and the built environment become instruments of territorial control, operating through routine technical decision rather than declared policy.²⁸ Fiscal entrenchment operates through budget lines and infrastructural expenditure that create sunk costs and constituencies with material stakes in continuation. Judicial insulation operates where the capacity of

²⁵Dov Schwartz, *Faith at the Crossroads: A Theological Profile of Religious Zionism* (Leiden: Brill, 2002).

²⁶Ian S. Lustick, *For the Land and the Lord: Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1988).

²⁷George Tsebelis, *Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).

²⁸Eyal Weizman, *Hollow Land: Israel’s Architecture of Occupation* (London: Verso, 2007).

courts to review or reverse territorial decisions is curtailed, whether through appointment patterns or through jurisdictional change.

The analytical yield of specifying SRN in this way is that it makes the framework indifferent to sincerity. It is not necessary to establish that a finance minister believes what he says about the land. It is necessary only to establish that the institutional configuration makes his saying otherwise costly and his acting otherwise difficult. This is an empirically tractable question in a way that motive is not.

International Legal and Diplomatic Response Dynamics (ILDRD)

The third pillar concerns the international system's response and its characteristic failure. Securitisation theory supplies a partial account: claims framed as existential are lifted out of ordinary political negotiation and into a register where normal bargaining does not apply.²⁹ But securitisation was formulated to explain the domestic authorisation of emergency measures, not the international response to a state whose territorial claims are theologically constituted. The extension is one this framework undertakes explicitly rather than by assumption.

ILDRD traces the divergence between declaratory opposition and operational conduct: between the resolutions and opinions that states endorse and the arms transfers, trade preferences, and diplomatic protections they simultaneously maintain. The framework's prediction is that this divergence is not incidental but structural. Where TITC is high and SRN is institutionalised, external pressure encounters no transmission mechanism. The pressure is real; it simply has nothing to act upon, because the domestic actors who would translate it into policy adjustment are the actors whose position depends on no adjustment occurring.

The causal sequence

The framework asserts a sequence rather than a correlation. High TITC, absent institutional embedding, produces rhetoric without policy consequence and is compatible with ordinary diplomatic bargaining. Institutional embedding, absent theological formulation, produces a commitment that is costly to reverse but reversible in principle, since the constituencies involved hold material rather than obligatory stakes. It is the conjunction that generates the distinctive outcome: a commitment that is simultaneously insulated from electoral reversal by its institutional position and insulated from external pressure by its non-negotiable justification. ILDRD failure then feeds back into TITC, since the demonstrated ineffectiveness of international response weakens the domestic argument that moderation is prudentially necessary.

Measurement and observable implications

Each pillar generates indicators drawn from the public record, and the framework is deliberately constructed so that no measurement depends on privileged access. TITC is coded from the negotiated and legislative record rather than from public rhetoric: the presence of theologically framed territorial provisions in coalition agreements, which are bargained instruments in which parties extract enforceable commitments; their appearance in basic-law or constitutional provision; and their presence in the platforms of parties

²⁹Ole Wæver, "Securitization and Desecuritization," in *On Security*, ed. Ronnie D. Lipschutz (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 46–86. See also Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998), chap. 2.

whose participation in government is conditional upon them. Coding proceeds by government formation, producing a variable that changes at identifiable moments rather than continuously.

SRN is coded from four institutional indicators: the pivotality of parties holding such commitments, measured by whether their withdrawal would terminate the government; the allocation of ministerial portfolios with territorial competence; budget lines directed to territorial infrastructure, which generate material constituencies; and the scope of judicial review over territorial decisions, measured by appointment patterns and by jurisdictional change. ILDRD is coded from the divergence between multilateral endorsement and bilateral conduct: voting records and resolution texts on one side, arms transfer registers, trade preference schedules, and diplomatic protection on the other.

The framework's central observable implication is a conditional one. Where TITC and SRN are jointly high, territorial policy output should be insensitive to variation in international pressure. Where either is low, policy output should exhibit the responsiveness that standard accounts predict. This yields a two-by-two expectation that can be assessed against periodised data within a single case, before any cross-national comparison is attempted — which is methodologically preferable, since it holds constant the many features of a case that cross-national comparison cannot.

SCOPE CONDITIONS AND FALSIFICATION

A framework that cannot fail explains nothing, and the boundaries of TMTR are therefore stated explicitly.

Scope

TMTR applies to state-level territorial behaviour where all three definitional conditions obtain. It does not apply to non-state armed groups, whose relation to territory and to institutional constraint differs fundamentally. It does not apply where territorial policy is principally security-driven even if religious language accompanies it; the annexation of strategically motivated terrain by a government that also employs theological vocabulary is not a TMTR case, and treating it as one would drain the framework of content. It does not apply to religious mobilisation without territorial specificity.

Falsification

Four findings would count decisively against the framework. First, evidence that in a coded high-TITC period, settlement or annexation activity did not exceed that of low-TITC periods once material and security variables are controlled, would undercut the claim that theological intensity has policy consequence. Second, a case in which a high-TITC, institutionally embedded territorial commitment was reversed under external pressure without prior institutional change would falsify the core mechanism directly. Third, if the institutional indicators specified under SRN proved not to covary with policy output — if coalition veto points, fiscal entrenchment, and administrative staffing had no measurable relation to territorial decisions — the framework's central pathway would be unsupported. Fourth, if international pressure produced comparable non-response in matched cases lacking a TMTR configuration, then TMTR would be explaining a variance that is not there, and the standard accounts resting on enforcement asymmetry would be sufficient.

A fifth follows from Shelef. If systematic comparison showed that homeland claims of this kind shift at rates comparable to those he documents elsewhere, the framework's central assertion of institutional insulation would be undermined at its foundation.

The fourth condition is the most demanding and the most important, because it requires the framework to earn its place against the simpler explanation. The relevant test is comparative: cases in which sustained international pressure did alter territorial or governance behaviour — where sanction, isolation, and legal determination did register — should on this account be cases in which the TMTR configuration was absent. If they are not, the framework is redundant.

Illustrative Application: Israeli Territorial Policy since 1967

What follows is an illustration of the framework's analytical purchase, not a test of it. A test requires the systematic coding of the indicators specified in Section 3 across the full period, which is the work of a subsequent study. The purpose here is to show what the framework directs attention toward, and how that differs from what existing accounts foreground.

The historiographical baseline

Three positions structure the existing literature and none of them is dispensable. Shlaim's account treats Israeli strategic doctrine as the pursuit of unassailable military superiority such that adversaries have no alternative to negotiation on Israeli terms — a power-political explanation that accounts persuasively for the first decades of statehood.³⁰ Masalha argues for continuity of demographic and territorial logic across successive governments of differing political complexion.³¹ Gorenberg contends that the settlement enterprise emerged through administrative drift, local initiative, and bureaucratic improvisation rather than design.³² Khalidi situates the whole within a century-long settler-colonial arc.³³

Gorenberg's thesis is the one TMTR must confront most directly, since it is the strongest available argument that ideology is not doing the explanatory work. The response is not to deny the drift he documents but to observe that his account covers the founding decade and that drift, once institutionalised, ceases to be drift. What begins as improvisation can be consolidated into constraint; the analytically interesting question is when and through what mechanism that consolidation occurs. TMTR reframes the disagreement as one about periodisation rather than about kind.

PERIODISATION AND WITHIN-CASE VARIATION

The framework's most useful contribution to this case is that it predicts variation rather than constancy, and the record supplies variation to test it against. Four periods can be distinguished on the indicators specified above.

1967–1977: low TITC, low SRN. The settlement enterprise in its founding decade was directed by Labour-led governments whose public justification was overwhelmingly strategic — defensible frontiers, buffer depth, control of the Jordan Valley approaches. This is the period Gorenberg documents, and his characterisation of it as improvisational is largely persuasive on the framework's own indicators:

³⁰Avi Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2000), introduction.

³¹Nur Masalha, *Imperial Israel and the Palestinians: The Politics of Expansion* (London: Pluto Press, 2000).

³²Gershom Gorenberg, *The Accidental Empire: Israel and the Birth of the Settlements, 1967–1977* (New York: Times Books, 2006).

³³Rashid Khalidi, *The Hundred Years' War on Palestine: A History of Settler Colonial Conquest and Resistance, 1917–2017* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2020).

theological formulations appear in the discourse of movements rather than in coalition instruments, and no party holding such commitments occupied a pivotal governing position.

1977–1993: rising TITC, partial SRN. The change of government in 1977 brought both a different territorial vocabulary and, more consequentially, the incorporation of a religious-nationalist settlement movement into the machinery of implementation. Lustick's study belongs to and analyses this period, and its central finding — that influence was secured through administrative penetration and the relocation of debate rather than through formal constitutional entrenchment — describes the SRN pillar in formation rather than in completion. Zertal and Eldar's history of the settlement enterprise across four decades supplies the extension Lustick's study could not, tracing how movement, state, and army became progressively entangled in the administration of the territory,³⁴ and Gordon's analysis of the changing logic of occupation government identifies the administrative transformations through which control was exercised as the enterprise matured.³⁵

The reversals. This period contains the evidence most damaging to a crude version of the argument, and the framework must confront it directly. In 1982 Israel dismantled settlements in Sinai and withdrew; in 2005 it dismantled all settlements in Gaza and withdrew again. Both were executed by governments led by figures closely identified with the settlement enterprise. Any claim that theologically anchored territorial commitments are simply irreversible is refuted by these two cases.

The framework's response is that this is precisely the variation it predicts, and that the reversals are evidence for it rather than against it. Neither Sinai nor Gaza occupied the position in the operative theological geography that the West Bank occupies; the territorial claim in both cases was justified principally in security and settlement-practical terms rather than as the object of religious obligation, which is to say that TITC for those territories was low even while TITC for Judea and Samaria was high within the same governments at the same moment. Nor was either as deeply institutionally embedded: the coalition arithmetic did not make withdrawal government-ending, and the fiscal and administrative entrenchment was shallower. The framework therefore expects what occurred — reversal where the configuration was incomplete, persistence where it was not — and this within-case variation offers a stronger test than any cross-national comparison could, since it holds regime, period, and leadership largely constant.

1993–2015: consolidation. Settlement expansion continued across governments of differing composition through the Oslo period and after, which is the observation supporting Masalha's continuity thesis. On the framework's indicators the significant development is fiscal and infrastructural rather than discursive: expenditure on roads, utilities, and municipal services generated a resident population with material stakes and a bureaucratic apparatus with institutional ones, converting an ideological project into a distributive one and widening its constituency well beyond those who held the theological commitments originally motivating it.

2015–2025: entrenchment. The final period is the one the framework was constructed to address, and it is distinguished by the conjunction of all three pillars at high values: territorial commitments framed theologically appearing in constitutional and coalition instruments; parties holding those commitments occupying pivotal rather than peripheral coalition positions; ministerial competence over territorial administration allocated accordingly; and the scope of judicial review over territorial decisions contested and narrowed. On the framework's expectations, this is the configuration in which international pressure

³⁴Idith Zertal and Akiva Eldar, *Lords of the Land: The War Over Israel's Settlements in the Occupied Territories, 1967–2007*, trans. Vivian Eden (New York: Nation Books, 2007).

³⁵Neve Gordon, *Israel's Occupation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008).

should register least — and it is the period in which the most authoritative legal determination in the conflict's history produced no measurable adjustment.

The periodisation converts what is otherwise a single observation into a sequence with internal variation, and it is on that sequence, systematically coded, that the framework should be assessed.

THREE INSTRUMENTS READ CLOSELY

The framework asserts that a TMTR configuration can be identified from the public record. That assertion is worth demonstrating rather than repeating. What follows reads three instruments — one domestic, two international — against the criteria set out in Section 3, appraising each for what it establishes and what it does not.³⁶ The three are separated by eight years, and the sequence they form is the object of interest.

Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People (19 July 2018). The instrument carries constitutional-order status within the Israeli legal system, and two of its provisions bear directly on TITC. Section 1(a) opens by declaring the Land of Israel the historical homeland of the Jewish people, in which the State of Israel was established. The distinction between the two terms is not decorative. The State of Israel is a legal entity with administered boundaries; the Land of Israel is a category drawn from religious and national tradition whose extent the text nowhere specifies and which no statute defines. Section 7 then declares that the state views the development of Jewish settlement as a national value and undertakes to encourage and promote its establishment and consolidation.³⁷

The analytically significant feature is what Section 7 omits. It attaches no geographical qualifier to the settlement it commits the state to promoting. It does not confine that commitment to sovereign territory, and read alongside the undefined territorial category established in Section 1(a), it produces a constitutional-order undertaking to promote settlement within a space the same instrument declines to bound. Whether this was drafted deliberately or emerged from compromise is a question about intention that the framework does not need to answer; the institutional effect is identical either way, which is precisely the point of locating TMTR in institutions rather than in motive. Section 4, which makes Hebrew the state language and assigns Arabic a special status, does not concern territory directly but registers the same movement of a communal category into constitutional text.

Two further features of the instrument are informative for the framework. It passed by sixty-two votes to fifty-five with two abstentions, which is to say by seven votes in a house of one hundred and twenty. High TITC does not entail consensus, and the framework does not predict it; what it predicts is that a narrowly enacted commitment, once written into constitutional-order text, becomes substantially harder to reverse than the margin of its enactment would suggest. Second, the bill's sponsors included a legislator who would later hold the finance portfolio with responsibility for civil administration in the occupied territory. The passage of a figure from sponsorship of a TITC instrument to occupancy of an SRN position is the transmission the framework describes, and it is visible in the public record without recourse to any privileged source.

Security Council Resolution 2334 (23 December 2016). The resolution's declaratory language is as strong as the instrument permits. Its first operative paragraph reaffirms that Israeli settlement establishment in the

³⁶The appraisal follows Scott's criteria of authenticity, credibility, representativeness, and meaning. All three instruments are official texts of public record, and questions of authenticity and credibility do not arise; the analytical work lies in representativeness and meaning.

³⁷Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People, 19 July 2018, ss. 1(a), 4, 7.

territory occupied since 1967, including East Jerusalem, has no legal validity and constitutes a flagrant violation under international law; it reiterates the demand that Israel immediately and completely cease all settlement activity; and it underlines that the Council will not recognise changes to the 4 June 1967 lines other than those agreed between the parties.³⁸ It passed fourteen votes to none.

The resolution nonetheless illustrates the ILDRD gap within a single document, and does so more clearly than any commentary upon it. It was adopted under Chapter VI rather than Chapter VII, and it provided for no sanction and no coercive measure of any kind.³⁹ The unanimity, moreover, was produced by an abstention rather than a vote in favour: the permanent member whose position was decisive permitted adoption without endorsing it, and thereby preserved a posture of formal opposition to settlement alongside continued bilateral support for the state conducting it. The document therefore records, in its own voting line, exactly the divergence between declaratory and operational policy that the third pillar identifies. It is not that the Council failed to condemn. It condemned in the strongest terms the instrument allowed, and attached nothing to the condemnation.

The Advisory Opinion of 19 July 2024. The Court's opinion is the most authoritative determination available on the question and it foreclosed the principal legal defences. It held Israel's continued presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory unlawful, found that assertion of sovereignty over and annexation of parts of that territory violate the prohibition on acquisition of territory by force, held that security concerns cannot override that prohibition, and specified that the illegality extends to the entirety of the territory occupied in 1967. It further held that the Oslo Accords create no exception, closing the argument that the arrangements agreed between the parties displace the general law.⁴⁰ The obligation to cease all new settlement activity was stated as immediate. Settlement authorisation continued.

Read as a sequence, the three instruments describe two trajectories that do not intersect. Between 2016 and 2024 the international declaratory register hardened: from a Council resolution reaffirming illegality without coercive provision, to a judicial determination that the occupation itself is unlawful and that the parties' own agreements furnish no exception. Over the same interval the domestic institutional register hardened in the opposite direction, with a commitment to promoting settlement written into constitutional-order text in terms that decline to bound the territory concerned. Neither trajectory registers in the other. That non-intersection is the phenomenon this article set out to explain, and it is documented in three public texts that any reader may consult.

Sacred geography and the regional propagation of territorial policy

Two further observations bear on the framework's reach. The first concerns the relation between site and territory examined in Section 2.3. Friedland and Hecht's study of the government of Jerusalem demonstrates how completely the administrative and the sacral can be interwoven within a single municipal apparatus, so that decisions about zoning, permits, and access carry sacral significance without ever being framed in theological language.⁴¹ This matters for the framework because it identifies the mechanism by which the sacral register extends from site to territory: not by explicit theological designation of the wider

³⁸United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2334, S/RES/2334, 23 December 2016, operative paras. 1–3.

³⁹On the absence of coercive provision, see Khalidi, *Hundred Years' War on Palestine*.

⁴⁰International Court of Justice, *Legal Consequences Arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Including East Jerusalem*, Advisory Opinion of 19 July 2024, I.C.J. Reports 2024, para. 285 and accompanying reasoning.

⁴¹Roger Friedland and Richard Hecht, *To Rule Jerusalem* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

area, which rarely occurs, but through the incorporation of sacral considerations into the routine administrative decisions through which territory is actually governed. The extension is bureaucratic before it is doctrinal, which is why SRN rather than TITC is the pillar that carries the analytical weight.

The second concerns propagation. Territorial policy in this case does not remain contained within the state that makes it. Halliday's structural account of the regional order establishes that the Middle Eastern security complex is unusually densely interconnected, so that developments in one arena reconfigure calculations across the whole,⁴² and Barnett's account of Arab bargaining shows in detail how territorial developments become currency in negotiations among states not directly party to them.⁴³ A TMTR configuration in one state therefore imposes costs on neighbouring states that had no part in producing it — most directly on those bearing the demographic consequences of displacement, and on those whose own domestic legitimacy is affected by their posture toward the territorial question.

This has an implication the framework should state plainly. If the institutional configuration described here is genuinely resistant to external pressure, then the states most exposed to its consequences are also the states least able to alter it, since the instruments available to them — diplomatic protest, conditional normalisation, economic linkage — operate on precisely the cost ledger the configuration renders inoperative. The regional dimension is therefore not an extension of the argument but a further instance of it.

The internal contest

A framework asserting that theological commitment drives territorial policy must account for the fact that theological commitment has never run in a single direction. Leibowitz — an observant Orthodox philosopher, not a secular critic — argued from within the tradition that prolonged occupation would corrupt the Jewish state and the Judaism practised within it.⁴⁴ Substantial Haredi currents rejected the theological premises of the state itself. TMTR accommodates this rather than being embarrassed by it, and the accommodation is a consequence of the institutional formulation: the framework does not claim that a religion generates a territorial policy, but that a *particular institutional configuration* converts one contested reading of a tradition into binding state commitment while marginalising others. The internal contest is evidence for the framework, not against it, since it demonstrates that the outcome required institutional work rather than following automatically from belief.

Comparative Probe: Jammu and Kashmir

Portability is a claim that must be tested against a case the framework was not built on. Hindu nationalist territorial politics in Jammu and Kashmir offers a demanding probe, and the comparison is instructive precisely where it is imperfect.

The Hindutva movement, documented across its intellectual and organisational history by Jaffrelot, exhibits theologically formulated territorial claims and an institutional nexus operating through an organisational

⁴²Fred Halliday, *The Middle East in International Relations: Power, Politics and Ideology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), chap. 1.

⁴³Michael N. Barnett, *Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), chap. 1.

⁴⁴Yeshayahu Leibowitz, *Judaism, Human Values, and the Jewish State*, ed. Eliezer Goldman (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992).

network extending well beyond formal party structures.⁴⁵ Bose's study of the conflict supplies the territorial and constitutional detail against which the framework can be assessed, and Jaffrelot's later study of Hindu nationalism in government examines the 2019 revocation of the constitutional provision granting Jammu and Kashmir special status — the event most directly relevant here, since it represents territorial reordering executed through domestic constitutional procedure rather than military administration.⁴⁶⁴⁷ Goddard herself lists Kashmir alongside Jerusalem among the paradigmatic instances of indivisible territory, which makes the case a natural site for adjudicating between her account and the one proposed here.

The differences are as analytically useful as the similarities. The religious tradition differs; the constitutional order differs, with territorial change effected through domestic constitutional procedure rather than through military administration; and the degree of international legal exposure differs sharply, there being no advisory opinion or comparable adjudication. That last difference is methodologically valuable, because it permits partial isolation of the ILDRD pillar: if non-response obtains in a case where authoritative international legal determination is absent, then international legal failure cannot be doing the work that the framework attributes to it, and the pillar requires reformulation.

The probe therefore functions as a genuine risk to the framework rather than as corroborating illustration. Its most likely yield is a refinement of scope: the specification of which institutional configurations produce TMTR outcomes under which constitutional conditions. That would be a more useful result than confirmation.

IMPLICATIONS

For theory

The framework's contribution to the religion-and-IR literature is a mechanism rather than a further demonstration of relevance. That literature has established, convincingly and repeatedly, that religion matters to international politics. What has been less well specified is *how* — through what institutional pathway a religious commitment becomes a state behaviour that persists against interest. By locating the answer in institutional embedding rather than in belief, TMTR offers a formulation that is measurable from the public record and testable by researchers without privileged access to elite motive.

The contribution to the indivisibility literature is a specification of stickiness. Goddard established that indivisibility is constructed through legitimation; TMTR proposes the conditions under which constructed indivisibility becomes institutionally locked, and therefore why some legitimation strategies prove reversible and others do not. The two accounts are complementary and jointly stronger than either alone. Toft's demonstration that indivisibility extends conflict duration acquires, on this reading, a mechanism: duration is extended not because indivisibility is felt more intensely but because it has been built into institutions that outlast the actors who constructed them.⁴⁸

⁴⁵Christophe Jaffrelot, ed., *Hindu Nationalism: A Reader* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).

⁴⁶Christophe Jaffrelot, *Modi's India: Hindu Nationalism and the Rise of Ethnic Democracy*, trans. Cynthia Schoch (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2021).

⁴⁷Sumantra Bose, *Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003).

⁴⁸Monica Duffy Toft, *The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests, and the Indivisibility of Territory* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), chap. 1.

For international response

The policy implication is diagnostic rather than prescriptive, and it is uncomfortable. If the argument holds, the prevailing international response to territorial claims of this kind — condemnation, sanction, legal determination — is not merely insufficient. It is misdirected, in the specific sense that it applies cost–benefit deterrence to behaviour that is not principally cost–benefit driven, and it will therefore continue to generate the pattern observed after July 2024: authoritative determination followed by no adjustment, which in turn erodes the credibility of the determining institution without altering the conduct it addressed.

The corollary is that effective engagement would have to operate on the institutional configuration rather than on the cost ledger — on coalition structure, fiscal entrenchment, administrative appointment, and judicial capacity, which are the variables through which the commitment is actually held in place. This article does not claim to have designed that alternative architecture, and it would be irresponsible to pretend that identifying a mechanism amounts to prescribing a remedy. What the framework supplies is a reason to expect that continued application of the current instruments will not produce the result they are intended to produce.

CONCLUSION

The puzzle with which this article opened was not why Israel failed to comply with the International Court of Justice, which admits of familiar answers concerning bindingness and enforcement, but why an authoritative legal determination produced no measurable adjustment of any kind. The answer proposed is that where a territorial claim has been theologically formulated and institutionally embedded, the mechanism through which such pressure ordinarily operates is absent. There is no ledger entry for the cost imposed, because the value being defended is not denominated in that currency, and there is no domestic constituency positioned to translate external pressure into policy revision, because the relevant actors hold their positions on the strength of the commitment in question.

Theologically Motivated Territorial Revisionism has been specified here as a claim about institutions rather than belief, bounded by explicit scope conditions, and accompanied by four findings that would falsify it. Its relation to adjacent frameworks is one of specification rather than displacement: it accepts the constructivist account of how indivisibility is produced and adds an account of when the product becomes irreversible; it accepts sacred-space theory at the level of the site and extends the analysis to the level of national policy; it operates alongside settler-colonial analysis at a different level of explanation and answers a different question.

Whether the framework survives contact with systematic evidence is an open question, and the design that would answer it is specified in Section 4. What can be said with more confidence is that the puzzle is real, that the standard explanations leave a residual, and that a discipline which has now spent two decades establishing that religion matters to international politics is owed an account of the institutional route by which it comes to matter. This article is an attempt to supply one.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Barnett, Michael N. *Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1998.
- Berger, Peter L., ed. *The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics*. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999.

- Bose, Sumantra. *Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003.
- Brubaker, Rogers. "Religion and Nationalism: Four Approaches." *Nations and Nationalism* 18, no. 1 (2012): 2–20.
- Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998.
- Fox, Jonathan. "Religion as an Overlooked Element of International Relations." *International Studies Review* 3, no. 3 (2001): 53–73.
- . *Religion, Civilization, and Civil War: 1945 Through the New Millennium*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2004.
- Fearon, James D. "Rationalist Explanations for War." *International Organization* 49, no. 3 (1995): 379–414.
- Friedland, Roger, and Richard Hecht. *To Rule Jerusalem*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- Gilpin, Robert. *War and Change in World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.
- Goddard, Stacie E. "Uncommon Ground: Indivisible Territory and the Politics of Legitimacy." *International Organization* 60, no. 1 (2006): 35–68.
- Gordon, Neve. *Israel's Occupation*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008.
- Goertz, Gary, and Paul F. Diehl. *Territorial Changes and International Conflict*. London: Routledge, 1992.
- Gorenberg, Gershom. *The Accidental Empire: Israel and the Birth of the Settlements, 1967–1977*. New York: Times Books, 2006.
- Halliday, Fred. *The Middle East in International Relations: Power, Politics and Ideology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- Hassner, Ron E. "To Halve and to Hold: Conflicts over Sacred Space and the Problem of Indivisibility." *Security Studies* 12, no. 4 (2003): 1–33.
- . *War on Sacred Grounds*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009.
- Hurd, Elizabeth Shakman. *The Politics of Secularism in International Relations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007.
- International Court of Justice. *Legal Consequences Arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Including East Jerusalem*. Advisory Opinion of 19 July 2024. I.C.J. Reports 2024.
- Jaffrelot, Christophe, ed. *Hindu Nationalism: A Reader*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007.

- Jaffrelot, Christophe. *Modi's India: Hindu Nationalism and the Rise of Ethnic Democracy*. Translated by Cynthia Schoch. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2021.
- Juergensmeyer, Mark. *The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.
- Khalidi, Rashid. *The Hundred Years' War on Palestine: A History of Settler Colonial Conquest and Resistance, 1917–2017*. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2020.
- Leibowitz, Yeshayahu. *Judaism, Human Values, and the Jewish State*. Edited by Eliezer Goldman. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992.
- Lustick, Ian S. *For the Land and the Lord: Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1988.
- Masalha, Nur. *Imperial Israel and the Palestinians: The Politics of Expansion*. London: Pluto Press, 2000.
- Mearsheimer, John J. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York: W.W. Norton, 2001.
- Pierson, Paul. "Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics." *American Political Science Review* 94, no. 2 (2000): 251–67.
- Petito, Fabio, and Pavlos Hatzopoulos, eds. *Religion in International Relations: The Return from Exile*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.
- Powell, Robert. "War as a Commitment Problem." *International Organization* 60, no. 1 (2006): 169–203.
- Philpott, Daniel. *Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001.
- . "The Challenge of September 11 to Secularism in International Relations." *World Politics* 55, no. 1 (2002): 66–95.
- Sandal, Nukhet A., and Jonathan Fox. *Religion in International Relations Theory: Interactions and Possibilities*. London: Routledge, 2013.
- Shelef, Nadav G. *Homelands: Shifting Borders and Territorial Disputes*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2020.
- Schwartz, Dov. *Faith at the Crossroads: A Theological Profile of Religious Zionism*. Leiden: Brill, 2002.
- Schweller, Randall L. "Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?" *Security Studies* 5, no. 3 (1996): 90–121.
- Shlaim, Avi. *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World*. New York: W.W. Norton, 2000.
- Toft, Monica Duffy. *The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests, and the Indivisibility of Territory*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003.

- Tsebelis, George. *Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002.
- United Nations Security Council. Resolution 2334. S/RES/2334, 23 December 2016.
- Veracini, Lorenzo. *Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.
- Wæver, Ole. "Securitization and Desecuritization." In *On Security*, edited by Ronnie D. Lipschutz, 46–86. New York: Columbia University Press, 1995.
- Wald, Kenneth D., and Clyde Wilcox. "Getting Religion: Has Political Science Rediscovered the Faith Factor?" *American Political Science Review* 100, no. 4 (2006): 523–29.
- Weizman, Eyal. *Hollow Land: Israel's Architecture of Occupation*. London: Verso, 2007.
- Zertal, Idith, and Akiva Eldar. *Lords of the Land: The War Over Israel's Settlements in the Occupied Territories, 1967–2007*. Translated by Vivian Eden. New York: Nation Books, 2007.
- Wolfe, Patrick. "Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native." *Journal of Genocide Research* 8, no. 4 (2006): 387–409.