ACADEMIA International Journal for Social Sciences
Volume 5, Issue 3(b), 2026 ISSN-L (Online): 3006-6638

Autonomous Weapons and Accountability: Ethical and Legal Perspective

Muhammad Abubaker Umer
Sahibzada.ma.umer@gmail.com
MPhil Scholar, Department of International Relations, University of Sargodha, Punjab, Pakistan.

Dr. Ashfaq Ahmed
ashfaq.hameed@uos.edu.pk
Professor, Chairman, Department of International Relations, University of Sargodha, Punjab, Pakistan.

Corresponding Author: Muhammad Abubaker Umer Sahibzada.ma.umer@gmail.com

Received: 12-02-2026 **Revised:** 26-02-2026 **Accepted:** 13-03-2026 **Published:** 28-03-2026

ABSTRACT

Weapons that operate without direct human control are referred to as autonomous weapons. The emergence of these weapons and their increasing utilisation have fundamentally transformed the dynamics of national security and warfare. Although Artificial Intelligence's (AI) integration into military mechanisms has improved speed and precision, it has come at the critical cost of accountability. In cases where machines autonomously make life-and-death decisions, fixing clear responsibility on a particular state or any individual becomes extremely difficult (International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 2019). This gap specifically undermines IHL, impairing distinction, proportionality, and precaution. For instance, investigative journalists have asserted that large-scale killings in Gaza were the result of AI-assisted systems, such as Lavender and Gospel, in which humans have limited or no control in critical decisions. The war against Hamas caused 83% of civilian casualty rate as of May 2025, according to a joint investigation by Yuval Abraham (Abraham, 2024) and Emma Graham Harrison (Graham-Harrison, 2024). However, this analysis remains highly contested. An analysis of the "Black-Box" nature of deep-learning algorithms demonstrates how technological advancement has undermined criminal and command responsibility. This research reviews available literature, gaps in the existing legal framework, case studies, and theoretical perspectives. The divergent opinions of global superpowers and key stakeholders, such as the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (GGE), will also be assessed. This introspection concludes with critical suggestions regarding a new treaty sanctioning or enforcing strict regulations for Autonomous Lethal Weapon Systems (ALWS). It calls for a legal regime that incorporates meaningful human control in vital decisions, imposes binding responsibility on deploying states and promotes an ethics-based AI framework. The ultimate goal is to align legal, technological, and policy frameworks to ensure the protection of fundamental human rights and preserve state sovereignty in the era of AI.

Keywords: *Autonomous Weapon Systems (AWS), International Humanitarian Law (IHL), Lethal Autonomous Weapons (LAWS), Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), International Criminal Law (ICL), Group of Governmental Experts (GGE).*

INTRODUCTION:

AI and robotics have transformed modern combat mechanisms. They have enabled drones, missiles, and loitering munitions to incorporate machine learning capable of processing sensor data, identifying targets, and even pulling the trigger with little or no human oversight. This means that many experts note that autonomous systems can offer advantages in speed, persistence, and a reduced threat to innocent lives. They also challenge traditional ethical and legal norms. The prevailing LOAC has traditionally perceived a human as a decision-maker behind every use of fire. However, AWS deviates from this paradigm as lethal force is decoupled from human moral reasoning. This shift raises a key question as to who is to be held responsible if an AI-operated weapon unlawfully harms civilians (Scharre, 2018).

Circumstances warrant more robust national security policies. This leads to the urgent need for global cooperation in amending the legal frameworks along the lines of the ethical incorporation of technology and the upholding of state sovereignty. For example, the United Nations Charter defines aggression as an act of war against another nation, but it falls short of addressing modern threats that are predominantly powered by AI. These threats range from cyber-physical attacks to deepfake cyber operations. They can dismantle critical infrastructure, sabotage state operations, manipulate electoral systems, and even kill people. All this at unprecedented speed and an unprecedented ability to camouflage themselves capable of defying conventional security mechanisms. This leaves the framers of international law with the urgent task of addressing the silence in existing legal treaties, conventions, and documents in relation to AI.

The core problem that has arisen since the emergence of AI technology is the "accountability gap". This is because of the shortcomings of traditional legal frameworks in assigning responsibility for harm caused by AWS. The principal reason is the opaque nature of the "black-box" algorithms often relied on by AI systems. Such is their impact that even system developers find it difficult to determine whether an act was intentional or the result of negligence, which cause significant challenges for ICL. Amid these circumstances, this study aims to offer a comprehensive and substantive assessment of the challenges and risks involved in the conundrum of technological advancement and legal regulations. It also proposes probable solutions to bridge the gap. The analysis will include an examination of the historical evolution of national security, legal documents, and reports calling for a new global "Magna Carta" for AI.

LITERATURE-REVIEW

The Cold War witnessed technological advancements and military strategy. However, modern times have seen AI complicating the nexus of security and law. Twenty-first-century scholarly discourse is witnessing a shift from kinetic firepower to digital destabilisation caused by AI-based autonomous cyber operations and Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS).

Locating AI in the Security-Law Nexus:

The incorporation of AI-based algorithms to ignite violence has created an atmosphere that is described by some scholars as an "accountability black hole". The fragmentation of legal liability across developers, manufacturers, and operators has made accountability difficult in the case of violations of IHL (Filippo Santoni de Sio, 2018). This is due to AI's inability to comprehend complex human situations and ethical guidelines. Its targeting algorithm lacks the ability to distinguish a combatant actively fighting from one offering surrender.

Cybersecurity as a Strategic Security and Legal Concern:

Joseph Nye's idea of "cyber power" highlights the significant shift of the global power regime. This means that even smaller states and non-state actors can compete with world powers utilising asymmetric, ubiquitous tools (Nye, 2010). However, the pace at which AI has evolved and been increasingly incorporated into power mechanisms has surpassed the concerns noted by Nye. This is reflected in AI-powered tools' adaptive capabilities, automated decisions, and autonomous cyber-physical weapons. Their intrusion is faster not only than conventional weapons but also faster than human comprehension. The Tallinn Manual 2.0 (2017)'s recommendations are limited to cyber operations but falls short of specifically resolving the conundrum of AI autonomy due to its non-binding nature.

Ethical Challenges, Hybrid Warfare, and Cognitive Threats:

Isaac Asimov's "Three Laws of Robotics" provide the foundation for developing an ethical landscape. They emphasise that a robot shall not be deployed to harm humanity. However, modern realities are different. AI often operates beyond protocols, without human oversight and emotional discernment (Asimov, 1950).

These circumstances have given birth to an era where automated disinformation, deepfakes, and algorithmic propaganda shape "Hybrid Warfare". It has already influenced major political events. Lines between reality and fiction have been blurred and diplomacy is feared to be on the verge of collapse.

Scholarly Contribution on Surveillance and Escalation:

Automated collection of behavioural data was once a corporate strategy. As AI has been incorporated into defence mechanisms, the same has been co-opted by defence institutions. This adaptation is defined by Shoshana Zuboff's theoretical description of "Surveillance Capitalism" (Zuboff, 2019). Governments are deploying this AI tool to monitor their citizens' activities. Examples include the PRISM program of the United States and the Social Credit System of China. Paul Scharre argues that as the same mechanism has been deployed in the military domain warfare has been reshaped. While international law has failed to appreciate the AI-based transformation of algorithmic combat decision-making (Scharre, 2018). This shift has established "Algorithmic Supremacy", eroding state power, and blurring the accountability framework. This is because complex codes are not easily governed by traditional statutes.

International Law and the AI Security Dilemma:

Another new dimension that the AI security debate has opened is the "Sovereignty Accountability Dilemma". Cyber operations have blurred territorial lines as even the specially designed international legal tools such as the United Nations Group of Government Experts Cyber Norms remain ineffective in bringing culprits to justice (Hollis, 2020). Eminent scholars like Rebecca Crootof advocate for a legally binding AI weapons regulation treaty. They argue that AI is equally accessible to state and non-state actors, and if left unchecked, it may further endanger accountability mechanisms (Crootof, 2018). This means that significant work is necessary to fill gaps in the prevailing international legal regime, particularly in the domain of assigning responsibility.

Theoretical Framework:

The interwoven relation of AI, national security and international law can be fundamentally evaluated through the theoretical prisms of realism, liberalism and constructivism. Modern challenges call for a renewed "Adaptive Nationalism" to cope with this challenge.

Realism and the AI Power Race:

Realism believes in the survival of the fittest. It posits that the only thing that can save a state in an anarchic world is a stronger defence mechanism. States' policies are accordingly driven by security and power parameters (Morgenthau, 1948). AI is now seen through the lens of the "AI power race", where states are pursuing advanced automated weapons to maintain a cutting edge advantage over other states. Realists argue that AI's asymmetric and ubiquitous characteristics have disrupted the traditional "zero-sum" equation of states. Non-state actors can equally exploit AI-based technology (Schmitt, 2017).

Liberalism and the Governance Deficit:

Liberalism advocates for incorporating multilateral institutions and international law to seek peaceful resolutions to disputes, confrontations, and differences (Keohane, 2012). Liberals believe that global institutions have failed to offer enforcement regulations. They argue that instruments such as the UNESCO's Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence (2021) and the UN Principles for the Ethical Use of Artificial Intelligence (2022). Guidelines are voluntary and lack enforcement mechanisms. Neither can they restrict states from deploying AI in warfare nor can they penalise those who violate the guidelines. They

call for the world to unite in adopting binding and enforceable treaties, capable of holding states accountable, and curbing the exploitation of AI potential in warfare technologies and the arms race.

Constructivism and the Influence of Norms:

Constructivism stresses that social norms, mutually constructed behaviours, and societal perceptions are vital cogs in defining security threats (Wendt, 1999). However, increasing instances of disinformation campaigns and "black-box systems" have significantly diluted this idea. Now trust between states is uncertain and public belief is shaky. Yet, constructivists argue that the public conscience, in accordance with the Martens Clause, should be led by humanitarian norms. Autonomous weapons systems should not be allowed to sabotage the fundamental ethics of mankind.

Adaptive Multilateralism for AI Governance (AMAG):

This study will explore the prospects of a specific resolution to the legal conundrum created by AI. This proposal includes a non-conventional hybrid theoretical framework that can be titled "Adaptive Multilateralism for AI Governance". AMAG is a unique proposal that combines constructivist norm evolution, liberal institutionalism cooperative structure, and legal realism's pragmatic focus on state power. This framework calls for a multilateral, multidimensional, and dynamic approach involving states, tech corporations, and civil society to ensure the rule of law and global security.

MATERIAL AND METHODS:

This research is fundamentally based on analysing secondary data. Diverse but highly relevant literature from government departments, academic journals, and international think tanks is examined.

Data Source:

The research paper centres on the introspection of official documents, reports, and case studies. Academic research papers are reviewed; this includes the Geneva Convention, UN General Assembly Resolutions, ICRC and NGO reports and government policy documents.

Data Collection:

Data is collected through systematic research, the study of archives, inspection of legal documents, and academic bibliographies (United Nations General Assembly, Various years; International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 2019). News headlines specifically in relation to AWS in the global arena in 2026, were analysed. The case study of killings in Gaza, Israel's Defence Forces leaked database, and Palestinian NGO reports were evaluated and cross-checked (The Guardian, 2024). Discrepancies were noted as well.

Analysis Process:

Collected data is interpreted through a legal lens. Case studies are examined against IHL. An attempt is made to answer questions regarding the impact of AWS on the parameters of the distinction, proportionality, and precaution and violations of international law. The conundrum of accountability and responsibility is also addressed.

Case Studies: Autonomous Weapons Systems in Conflict

The Gaza Conflict (2023-2024)

The Gaza war was arguably the greatest demonstration of AWS. Credible sources have indicated that Israel deployed AI-assisted targeting mechanisms during the two-year conflict. The Guardian and Al-Jazeera have reported that an AI system "Lavender and Gospel" was utilised to process and explore over 25,000 Gazan profiles. Although manual verification analysis of the possible targets was conducted. Human Rights Watch and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology have critiqued AI-exploitation in Gaza. It is claimed that 83 percent of the casualties were non-combatant civilians (The Guardian, 2024).

These findings, if correct, mean that multiple articles of the Additional Protocol I (AP I) of the Geneva Conventions have been violated (International Committee of the Red Cross, 1949/1977). This includes AP I's Article 48, which requires parties to restrict operations to combatants. Algorithm-based decision-making clearly violates this. Furthermore, Article 51(5) (b) prohibits civilian harm excessive to the anticipated military advantage. The casualty ratio of the Gaza war also reflects a similar breach. Independent analysts have also observed that this was a breach of proportionality.

However, ICL is limited to individual intent or recklessness. The Gaza case provides a clear depiction of the accountability gap: it perceives neither the programmer nor the pilot as guilty of a crime. Israeli officials have also maintained that their actions, profiling, and subsequent attacks are legally vetted. They further argue that their actions warrant no prosecution.

Cyber and Autonomous Attacks:

Another frontier that AI has influenced is the cyber domain. There are reports that AI has helped the creation of malware that can adapt to networks. Examples include an alleged AI-powered attack on Ukraine's critical infrastructure by the Russian Cyber Command in 2022-23. These attacks had the potential for significant damage with minimal human guidance. Although AP I empowers IHL to account for cyber-attacks used in armed conflict. However, a difficult attribution process makes fixing responsibility tough and accountability unlikely.

A related case citation is the utilisation of U.S. Predator drone strikes (2004-18) in Pakistan and Afghanistan. They were initially operated by human operators; however, of late they have moved towards AI target recognition. Although they are not yet fully autonomous, they can autonomously loiter over a target zone and fire based on sensor triggers. A well-known catastrophic incident was the US drone or AC-130 gunship mistakenly striking a hospital in Kunduz, Afghanistan. This was not an AWS issue per se, but it highlighted how even a human can make mistakes in distanced decision-making let alone the automated systems. (ICRC, 2016).

Other Drones Warfare Examples:

Nagorno-Karabakh (2020): Azerbaijan successfully utilised Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones (International Crisis Group, 2021; Centre for the Study of the Drone, 2021). These drones have autonomous features; however, they are deployed with a strict doctrine. Experts have observed that utilising semi-autonomous tools under human supervision reduces collateral damage, protects civilians, and specifically target legitimate military targets.

China-India Border (2020): Reports emerged in 2020 that China tested fully autonomous drones along the Line of Actual Control; however, limited details are available. India responded by cautioning the UN about the deployment of AWS at border areas.

The Isfahan Incident (2023): In 2023, a possible autonomous UAV hit Iran's Isfahan facility. Iran acknowledged that its facility had suffered minor damage (BBC News, 2023). This caused the deaths of Iranian advisers. Although Iran alleged that Israel perpetrated the incident, no conclusive evidence was ever found to assign responsibility.

Case studies prove that should AWS be deployed without human supervision, it will hamper trust, affect mutual relations, and cause unintended losses. The accountability dilemma is an additional challenge. These circumstances warrant a mechanism in which AWS works under human supervision and in accordance with ethical guidelines.

LEGAL ANALYSIS: IHL AND AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS SYSTEM

In this part, the mutual relationship between AWS and IHL mutual relationship, gaps, and improvement points will be discussed.

Distinction: This principle is codified under Article 48 of Additional Protocol I (International Committee of the Red Cross, 1949/1977). This provides that parties shall necessarily distinguish between civilians and combatants. AWS would use sensors and algorithms to fulfil this necessity. Although humans have their biases and can misuse the kinetic force operating under their control, but unchecked AI-based operations are far more concerning.

Proportionality: AP I's Article 51 provides that civilian loss can be permitted subject to proving that it is not excessive in proportion. Each matter of non-combatant loss is evaluated separately. The question arises whether an automated weapon can be programmed to minimise civilian casualties. The answer to this, in the context of ground realities, is probably not. If AWS cannot calibrate the potential non-combatant loss in the process of targeting an enemy. Even the Israeli Prime Minister accepted civilian loss during the war against Hamas in 2024 (BBC News, 2024)**.** Independent reviews also fear that AWS can increase collateral damage and intensify unintended loss.

Precautions: Article 57 of the 1977 treaty under the Geneva Convention calls for feasible precaution in initiating an attack. The target shall be verified, last moment information shall be respected, and civilian infrastructure shall be protected. Although this does not seem difficult under human oversight, AWS operating autonomously are probably unable to take such measures. Some AI platforms argue for developing a mechanism to ensure due care. However, the system may fail amidst complex urban warfare. An AI operation in contradiction of legal limits, working beyond human oversight, is considered an unlawful and negligent act.

Accountability and Liability: Prevailing law warrants criminal action in case of IHL breaches. The law is mainly centred on reprimanding the individual responsible for any illegal action. Legal codes should be redefined to fix responsibility on programmers, developers, and deployers of AI without human oversight in warfare. Analysts have proposed amendments to the existing laws. Therefore, it is suggested to explicitly incorporate an AWS clause in Additional Protocol I. Moreover, if a mechanism to regulate AI in warfare is not possible, its utilisation shall be highly constrained or banned entirely.

GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND POLICY:

UN and International Stance:

AWS has been the subject of discussion since 2013 at the UN's Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). Although no treaty has emerged, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) has witnessed negotiations on this subject. In 2024, the UNGA, through its resolution, called for continued talks.

In the next year, they approved a resolution that called on the (CCW) to finalize a "political declaration or framework instrument" by 2026. These episodes overwhelmingly indicate rising concerns for action (United Nations General Assembly, 2025).

The UN forum has seen prominent voices calling for strict AI control. None other than the ICRC's President Spoljaric in 2024 observed that the "human judgment must remain central in decisions posing risks to lives" (Spoljaric, 2024). Many member states have emphasised the need for a treaty prohibiting "unpredictable" AWS operating beyond human oversight. Its targeting ability was also received with concern. NGO records provide that more than 100 countries support either a ban or strict regulations on AWS (Stop Killer Robots Coalition, 2025).

However, the deadlock persists as the nations that lead in AI technology advocate for an AI code or voluntary limit for AWS. They include the USA, Russia, China, Israel, and Turkey. The U.S. acknowledges that a legal review is necessary for AWS; however, it opposes new bans at the CCW. They believe any sanction on these tools will reduce their military advantage. They argue that AI-powered military tools help control illegal activities such as terrorism and call for state-level internal regulations under the Department of War (Former Department of Defence).

National Policies:

- **United States of America:** The Department of War directive 3000.09 (2012, revised 2020) advocates for ensuring rigorous testing and a strict vetting process for AWS but does not call for banning any type (United States Department of Defense, 2020). Congress has held hearings on AWS; however, it has never initiated a related legislative process, let alone enacted any law. U.S. policies on AI are based on the principle of the "appropriate levels of human judgment". This is not in line with the prevailing military experts' views.

- **Pakistan:** Pakistan has been a victim of U.S. drone attacks. Drawing from its own lessons, Pakistan has reportedly expressed concerns at the UN that AWS may undermine IHL (Government of Pakistan, 2023). Pakistan advocates for a two-track approach; it calls for banning fully autonomous AWS platforms while framing guidelines for other AWS systems. In its domestic policy, Pakistan has pursued modern drone technology but has designed it systematically to operate under human surveillance. However, the country has not drafted a formal policy for AWS yet.

- **European Union:** The European Parliament perceives AWS as dangerous, but it has been cautious in its actions. It has adopted a non-binding resolution calling for the banning of autonomous weapons that work beyond human control (European Parliament, 2021). In parallel, France and Germany are continuously investing in AI-enabled defence capabilities that takes vital decisions under human oversight (Vincent Boulanin, 2017). Additionally, the EU AI Act, which was originally proposed in 2021 and adopted in 2024, excludes military and national security from its purview. This means that autonomous weapons are largely regulated by IHL and national frameworks.

- **Other States:** Important countries such as Japan, South Korea, Canada and many others support CCW efforts to regulate AWS. Vital Security Council members Russia and China, although calling for ethical consideration in deploying AI, have opposed binding constraints. As far as India is concerned, it calls for international standards but believes UAVs to be a critical component of its future warfare.

Non-State Actors and Industry:

Some technological firms, such as Google and Microsoft, are increasingly incorporating AI mechanisms. Defence strategies have been under AI influence. On the other hand, a significant number of NGOs are agitating for a ban on the incorporation of AI in warfare mechanisms. While non-state actors have exploited AI for their activities, these actors are sometimes seen deploying AI-powered drones.

Summary:

Global governance of AWS is fragmented. International legal mechanisms are weak. States are largely guided by their national interests rather than humanitarian grounds, while non-state actors are advancing in AI capabilities.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS:

On the basis of the critical analysis made in this paper the following recommendations are tendered.

- **Negotiate a Treaty:** Meaningful steps shall be taken to initiate CCW negotiations. This shall be aimed at drafting a new protocol or treaty to restrict AI from operating beyond human supervision. This recommendation is in line with the opinion expressed by international organisations such as the ICRC and HRW (International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 2019; Human Rights Watch, 2020).

- **Enact Domestic Controls:** National laws shall be addressed by the state legislatures. They shall be updated to align with humanitarian principles. Legal sanctions shall restrict AI operations without human oversight. War manuals shall be amended and ethical guidelines shall be respected.

- **Public Engagement:** Public awareness campaigns shall be organised. NGOs can educate the masses about the potential misuse of AI in warfare. This can help leverage public opinion to shape state policies. The media can also play its role. The basis of this move could be the example of the misuse of AI in Gaza.

- **Balance Military and Humanitarian Needs:** AI is not always detrimental. It can help preserve lives as well. Therefore, applying a blanket ban on utilising AI in military operations is not a wise idea. Therefore, policies shall distinguish between defensive and offensive AI utilisation. One example of an important area where AI can help is in bomb disposal systems.

These reforms mirror experts' opinions (Docherty, 2018), but they add reasonable action plan.

CONCLUSION:

Lethal Autonomous Weapons have pushed military ethics and law to a crossroads. This work has critically reviewed the intersection of AI-powered warfare tools with IHL and the prevailing debates. It has been assessed with great concern that major powers lack seriousness in drafting a global legal mechanism. They probably fear losing the competitive edge that AI technology provides to their militaries. However, nations should prefer humanity over vested interests. They should join hands in overhauling legal mechanisms, strengthening supervision processes, and ensuring human safeguards. This could be achieved through a "Geneva Convention 2.0", a binding resolution at the UNSC, or domestic legislation of states.

REFERENCES

Abraham, Y. (2024). *Lavender': The AI machine directing Israel's bombing spree in Gaza.* +972 Magazine / Local Call.

Retrieved from https://www.972mag.com/lavender-ai-israeli-army-gaza/

Asimov, I. (1950). *I, Robot.*

BBC News. (2023). Drone attack on Iran's Isfahan military facility causes minor damage. BBC News. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-64444352

BBC News. (2024). Israel-Gaza war: Netanyahu acknowledges civilian casualties in conflict with Hamas. BBC News.

Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-68310068

Centre for the Study of the Drone. (2021). Drone warfare in Nagorno-Karabakh: The TB2 and loitering munitions. Bard College.

Crootof, R. (2018). Autonomous weapon systems and the limits of law. *Harvard National Security Journal*.

Retrieved from https://journals.law.harvard.edu/nsj/wp-content/uploads/sites/82/2018/06/2_Crootof_LimitsOfAnalogy_06.08.18.pdf?

Docherty, B. (2018). *Heed the call: A moral and legal imperative to ban killer robots.* Human Rights Watch / Harvard Law School International Human Rights Clinic.

Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/08/21/heed-call/moral-and-legal-imperative-ban-killer-robots

European Parliament. (2021). *European Parliament resolution of 20 January 2021 on artificial intelligence*. https://doi.org/2020/2013(INI)

Filippo Santoni de Sio, &. J. (2018). Meaningful human control over autonomous systems: A philosophical account. *Frontiers in Robotics and AI*. https://doi.org/10.3389/frobt.2018.00015

Government of Pakistan. (2023). Statements at the United Nations on lethal autonomous weapons systems.

Retrieved from https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/1com/1com23/statements/23Oct_Pakistan.pdf

Graham-Harrison, E. (2024). *Israel-Gaza war: AI-assisted targeting and civilian casualties.* The Guardian.

Hollis, D. (2020). Journal of Cybersecurity. *Journal of Cybersecurity*.

Retrieved from https://academic.oup.com/cybersecurity/article/5/1/tyy009/5298865

Human Rights Watch. (2020). *Stopping killer robots: Country positions on banning fully autonomous weapons and retaining human control.* Human Rights Watch.

Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/08/10/stopping-killer-robots/country-positions-banning-fully-autonomous-weapons-and

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). (2019). *Autonomous weapon systems: Implications of increasing autonomy in the critical functions of weapons.* Geneva: ICRC.

Retrieved from https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/caucasus/nagorno-karabakh-azerbaijan/244-nagorno-karabakhs-gathering-war-cloud

International Committee of the Red Cross. (1949/1977). Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Protocol I). ICRC.

International Crisis Group. (2021). The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: Emerging military lessons for drone warfare. International Crisis Group.

Retrieved from https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/caucasus/nagorno-karabakh-azerbaijan/244-nagorno-karabakhs-gathering-war-clouds

Keohane, R. (2012). *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy.* Princeton University Press.

Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/243721473_After_Hegemony_Cooperation_and_Discord_in_World_Political_Economy

Morgenthau, H. (1948). *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace.* Knopf.

Retrieved from https://archive.org/details/politicsamongnat0006morg

Nye, J. (2010). Cyber power. *Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs*. Retrieved from https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/cyber-power

Scharre, P. (2018). *Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War.* New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

https://doi.org/978-0393608984

Spoljaric, M. (2024). Statement on autonomous weapons systems and the need for human control. Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross.

Retrieved from https://www.icrc.org/en/statement/icrc-president-act-within-law-requires-sustained-investment-ihl

Stop Killer Robots Coalition. (2025). *Global position on banning fully autonomous weapons.* Retrieved from https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/making-a-difference/

The Guardian. (2024). Investigative reports on Gaza conflict and AI-assisted targeting systems.

The Guardian. (2024). *Lavender': The AI system reportedly used by Israel to identify targets in Gaza.* The Guardian.

Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/apr/03/israel-defence-forces-ai-lavender-targeting-gaza

United Nations General Assembly. (2025). General and Complete Disarmament: Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems. New York: UNGA. https://doi.org/A/79/88

United Nations General Assembly. (Various years). *Resolutions on international security and autonomous weapons systems.*

United States Department of Defense. (2020). Directive 3000.09: Autonomy in Weapon Systems (Updated version). Washington, D.C.

Vincent Boulanin, &. M. (2017). *Mapping the development of autonomy in weapon systems.* Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

https://doi.org/SIPRI Policy Report 2017

Wendt, A. (1999). *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge University Press. Retrieved from https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/social-theory-of-international-politics/A787010C835490483E769B78D82A2E2C

Zuboff, S. (2019). *The Age of Surveillance Capitalism.* PublicAffairs. Retrieved from https://www.publicaffairsbooks.com/titles/shoshana-zuboff/the-age-of-surveillance-capitalism/9781610395694/