

**Executive–Legislative Relations in Hybrid Regimes: Institutional Interaction and Power Politics in Pakistan**

**Mujeeb Ali Shah**

[mujeebalishah345@gmail.com](mailto:mujeebalishah345@gmail.com)

BS Political Science, International Islamic university Islamabad, Pakistan

**Muhammad Sadiq Khan**

[muhammadsadiqkhan2004@gmail.com](mailto:muhammadsadiqkhan2004@gmail.com)

BS Political Science, International Islamic university, Islamabad, Pakistan

**Sifat Ullah Khan**

[sifatalikhan10@gmail.com](mailto:sifatalikhan10@gmail.com)

BS Political Science, International Islamic university, Islamabad, Pakistan

**Corresponding Author: \* Mujeeb Ali Shah ( [mujeebalishah345@gmail.com](mailto:mujeebalishah345@gmail.com) )**

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**ABSTRACT**

*In hybrid regimes, executive–legislative relations are rarely defined solely by constitutional provisions; instead, they are shaped by political bargaining, informal practices, and uneven power structures. Pakistan presents a compelling case where elected institutions coexist with strong non-elected actors, resulting in persistent tensions between democratic ideals and political realities. This study examines the interaction between the executive and legislature in Pakistan, with a focus on law-making, accountability, and instances of cooperation and conflict. The paper argues that executives often dominate the legislative arena through party discipline, ordinances, and informal influence, limiting parliamentary autonomy. At the same time, the legislature is not entirely passive; periods of assertiveness emerge when political consensus and public pressure align. By analyzing these shifting dynamics, the study highlights how institutional interaction in Pakistan reflects broader patterns common to hybrid regimes, where formal democratic structures coexist with power-driven politics. The findings suggest that executive–legislative relations in Pakistan remain fluid and contested, shaped by both institutional design and political power struggles. This case contributes to a deeper understanding of governance in hybrid regimes and the challenges facing democratic consolidation.*

**Keywords:** Hybrid regimes, Executive–legislative relations, Pakistan, Institutional interaction, Parliamentary autonomy, Power politics

**INTRODUCTION**

The relationship between the executive and the legislature lies at the heart of democratic governance. In classical democratic theory, this relationship is expected to be structured, rule-bound, and balanced through constitutional checks and balances. Legislatures are meant to represent the popular will, scrutinize executive action, and shape public policy, while executives are tasked with implementing and leading within clearly defined legal limits. However, in many contemporary political systems—particularly in the Global South—this idealized balance remains elusive. Instead, executive–legislative relations are often marked by asymmetry, contestation, and informal power arrangements that blur the boundaries between democratic practice and authoritarian control. These dynamics become especially pronounced in political systems commonly described as hybrid regimes, where democratic institutions coexist with persistent authoritarian features (Linz & Stepan, 1996; Levitsky & Way, 2010).

Hybrid regimes challenge conventional understandings of institutional politics because they operate in a space between democracy and authoritarianism. While elections are regularly held and legislatures formally exist, political power is frequently concentrated in the executive, supported by unelected institutions and informal networks. In such contexts, legislatures often struggle to perform their constitutional roles effectively, as executive dominance, weak party systems, and external interventions limit their autonomy. Scholars argue that hybrid regimes are not transitional phases but relatively stable political systems in which democratic procedures are selectively applied and routinely manipulated (Diamond, 2002; Schedler, 2006). As a result, executive–legislative relations in these systems cannot be understood solely through constitutional texts; they must be examined through the lens of power politics, elite bargaining, and institutional survival strategies.

Pakistan represents a particularly instructive case for examining executive–legislative relations in a hybrid regime. Since its independence in 1947, Pakistan has oscillated between civilian and military rule, with long periods of authoritarian governance interrupting democratic development. Even during civilian regimes, elected governments have operated under the shadow of powerful unelected actors, most notably the military and the higher judiciary. This has produced a political system where formal democratic institutions exist, yet their functioning is deeply constrained. The legislature, despite being constitutionally sovereign, has frequently been marginalized, dissolved, or subordinated to executive authority, especially during periods of political instability (Rizvi, 2018; Jalal, 1995).

The executive in Pakistan has historically exercised disproportionate influence over the legislative process. This dominance has taken multiple forms, including strong party discipline, frequent use of presidential or prime ministerial ordinances, control over parliamentary agendas, and the centralization of decision-making within the executive branch. Weak internal democracy within political parties further reinforces executive control, as legislators often depend on party leadership rather than parliamentary norms for political survival. Consequently, the legislature’s oversight capacity—particularly in areas such as budgetary control, accountability, and policy formulation—has remained limited (Ahmed, 2013; Waseem, 2006).

Yet, executive–legislative relations in Pakistan cannot be reduced to a simple narrative of executive domination. There have been moments when the legislature has demonstrated resilience and assertiveness, particularly during periods of political consensus and constitutional reform. The passage of the 18th Constitutional Amendment in 2010 stands as a notable example, where parliamentary unity curtailed presidential powers and strengthened provincial autonomy. Such episodes suggest that legislative institutions in Pakistan possess latent capacity, which can be activated under favorable political conditions. These fluctuations highlight the importance of examining institutional interaction as a dynamic process rather than a fixed structural outcome (Shah, 2014; International Crisis Group, 2010).

Understanding executive–legislative relations in Pakistan, therefore, requires moving beyond formal institutional analysis to incorporate the broader political environment in which these institutions operate. Informal norms, patronage networks, civil–military relations, and judicial interventions all shape how power is exercised and contested. In hybrid regimes, these informal factors often matter as much as, if not more than, constitutional provisions. The executive’s ability to bypass the legislature through ordinances or extra-parliamentary support illustrates how formal rules are routinely adjusted to suit shifting power configurations (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004; Siddiqi, 2017).

This study situates Pakistan within the broader comparative literature on hybrid regimes to examine how executive–legislative relations are shaped by institutional design and power politics simultaneously. By focusing on patterns of cooperation, conflict, and accommodation between the executive and legislature, the research seeks to explain why parliamentary authority remains fragile despite repeated democratic

transitions. Rather than treating institutional weakness as inevitable, the study explores the conditions under which legislative assertiveness emerges and the factors that constrain its sustainability. In doing so, it contributes to ongoing debates on democratic governance, institutional resilience, and political accountability in hybrid political systems (Levitsky & Way, 2010; Diamond, 2019).

### **Problem Statement**

In Pakistan, the relationship between the executive and the legislature has long been characterized by imbalance and contestation, reflecting broader challenges of governance in hybrid regimes. Despite constitutional provisions granting the legislature authority over law-making, oversight, and accountability, these powers are often undermined by executive dominance, weak party structures, and interference from unelected actors such as the military and judiciary. This creates a persistent tension between formal democratic rules and actual political practice, where parliamentary institutions struggle to assert autonomy while the executive frequently shapes legislative outcomes through informal influence and centralized control. Understanding how these dynamics unfold is crucial for explaining why democratic consolidation remains fragile in Pakistan and how institutional interactions are shaped by both constitutional design and power politics.

### **Research Objectives**

1. To examine the interaction between the executive and legislature in Pakistan, highlighting how formal constitutional rules and informal political practices shape their relationship.
2. To analyze the factors that limit or enhance legislative autonomy, including party dynamics, executive influence, civil–military relations, and external pressures.
3. To explore how affairs of cooperation and conflict between the executive and legislature affect governance, policy-making, and democratic consolidation in Pakistan.

### **Research Questions**

1. How do formal constitutional rules and informal political practices influence the interaction between the executive and legislature in Pakistan?
2. What are the key factors that constrain or strengthen legislative autonomy in the country?
3. In what ways do cooperation and conflict between the executive and legislature impact governance, policy-making, and the broader process of democratic consolidation in Pakistan?

### **Significance of the Study**

This study is significant as it examines the complex relationship between the executive and legislature in Pakistan, highlighting how formal rules and informal practices shape governance. By identifying factors that limit or strengthen legislative autonomy, such as party dynamics and civil–military influence, it provides insights into the functioning of hybrid political systems. Additionally, analyzing cooperation and conflict between these institutions helps understand their impact on policy-making and democratic consolidation, offering lessons relevant to Pakistan and other similar regimes.

## **LITERATURE REVIEW**

Scholars examining executive–legislative relations in comparative politics generally emphasize that the interaction between executives and legislatures is central to understanding how democratic accountability functions (Andeweg & Thies, 2020). In democratic theory, legislatures are expected to act as a check on executive authority through oversight, lawmaking, and accountability mechanisms. However, in hybrid regimes—where democratic forms coexist with authoritarian practices—the legislature’s capacity to hold the executive accountable often becomes constrained by informal power structures, executive dominance, and weak institutional norms (Hameed, 2022; Higashijima, 2016). Hybrid regimes thus blur the expected separation of powers, making executive–legislative relations a dynamic terrain shaped as much by political practice as by constitutional design.

In the Pakistani context, recent research highlights those formal constitutional provisions often fail to translate into effective legislative oversight of the executive. Imtiaz Ahmad and Javed Qamar’s comprehensive study of Pakistan’s Senate points out that although the 1973 Constitution established a bicameral parliament with oversight authority, the upper house’s practical ability to scrutinize executive action has been limited in practice (Ahmad & Qamar, 2024). They argue that while the Eighteenth Amendment (2010) enhanced the Senate’s statutory capacity to call the executive to account, persistent patterns of political dominance and procedural weaknesses continue to undermine meaningful scrutiny. This aligns with broader findings on legislative institutions in hybrid regimes where formal power is not always exercised independently (Andeweg & Thies, 2020; Hameed, 2022).

Afzal and Khan’s analysis of the 15th National Assembly (2018–2023) further underscores the endurance of executive predominance over Pakistan’s legislature. Their case study reveals that despite being constitutionally empowered, the National Assembly often operated under conditions where executive priorities shaped legislative outcomes, weakening its role as an effective check on the executive branch. They note historical patterns—such as premature dismissals of civilian governments—which have ingrained a culture of limited legislative autonomy and reinforced executive leverage in governance (Afzal & Khan, 2025). This reinforces the argument that formal oversight mechanisms are insufficient on their own in hybrid political systems where executive control over political institutions remains strong.

Focusing specifically on the Senate’s functioning, Abida Hassan and colleagues trace the evolution of the upper house within Pakistan’s federal structure and its role in legislative processes (Hassan, Alam, & Khan, 2023). Their comparative and historical analysis suggests that while the Senate is structurally positioned to balance regional interests and check the National Assembly, its contributions to executive oversight and institutional accountability have been mixed. They highlight that although bicameralism theoretically fosters checks and balances, practical constraints—such as political alignment with executive agendas and limited procedural authority—reduce the Senate’s independent impact. These findings mirror comparative insights into bicameral legislatures in other states where upper houses vary widely in influence depending on political culture and power distributions.

A broader perspective on Pakistan’s hybrid regime context comes from studies emphasizing civil–military relations and political polarization. Bhatti and Al-Qama illustrate how political polarization and bargaining between civilian leaders and the military have shaped institutional dynamics, often at the cost of robust legislative autonomy (Bhatti & Al-Qama, 2025). Their analysis shows that hybrid characteristics—such as informal veto powers and selective legal mechanisms—can weaken horizontal accountability, including legislative oversight. Although their focus is not exclusively on parliament, the implications for the legislative branch are clear: when informal forces predominate, the executive and associated power clusters often dictate governance outcomes, sidelining legislative oversight.

Another important dimension in the literature considers parliamentary procedures and committee systems as tools for oversight and accountability. Research on the committee structures in Pakistan's Senate demonstrates that these bodies have considerable potential to evaluate executive actions and enhance oversight when fully empowered (NIPA Peshawar, 2024). However, scholars also note that political interference, lack of resources, and weak enforcement capacity significantly limit the committees' real impact. This mirrors broader findings in comparative politics that strong committee systems correlate with more effective legislative scrutiny, but only when accompanied by political will and institutional independence (Crisis Group, 2013; Shimizu, 2020).

In addition to structural and procedural analyses, emerging scholarship explores oversight beyond domestic policy, such as Pakistan's parliamentary engagement in foreign policy through treaty ratification mechanisms (Ghouri, 2025). This work argues that extending legislative scrutiny to executive actions in foreign affairs can strengthen the democratic legitimacy of executive decisions and broaden oversight roles. Although this literature is still developing, it points to an expanding conception of executive–legislative interaction that goes beyond traditional domestic policy domains and reflects evolving expectations in democratic practice.

Collectively, these studies underscore the complexity of executive–legislative relations in Pakistan's hybrid regime. They reveal how constitutional reforms, bicameral structures, committee systems, and informal power dynamics interact to shape the legislature's autonomy and oversight capacity. While the Constitution provides for robust institutional checks, persistent executive dominance and political culture dynamics often compromise the legislature's role as an effective counterbalance. This body of literature highlights that understanding executive–legislative relations in hybrid regimes requires attention to both formal institutions and the broader political environment that conditions their operation.

### **Research Gap**

While existing studies have examined executive–legislative relations in Pakistan and hybrid regimes more broadly, most focus on formal constitutional provisions, historical patterns, or institutional structures such as the Senate and parliamentary committees. Less attention has been given to how informal power dynamics, party politics, and civil–military interactions influence the actual functioning of legislative oversight in practice. Additionally, few studies explore the interplay between cooperation and conflict between the executive and legislature and its impact on governance and democratic consolidation. This gap underscores the need for research that integrates both formal and informal dimensions to understand how executive–legislative relations truly operate in Pakistan's hybrid political context.

### **METHODOLOGY**

This study adopts a qualitative research design to explore executive–legislative relations in Pakistan, focusing on how formal institutions, informal power dynamics, and political practices shape the interaction between these branches of government. A qualitative approach is appropriate because it allows for an in-depth examination of complex political phenomena that cannot be captured fully through quantitative methods (Creswell & Poth, 2018).

### **Research Approach**

The research uses a case study approach, which provides an intensive investigation of specific instances of executive–legislative interaction within Pakistan's hybrid regime. The case study method enables the study to analyze both systemic patterns and particular events, such as parliamentary debates, committee oversight



processes, and instances of cooperation or conflict between the executive and legislature (Yin, 2018). This approach is especially suitable for understanding the interplay between formal constitutional provisions and informal political practices.

### **Sample**

The study focuses on key legislative sessions and committees of the National Assembly and Senate from 2018 to 2024. This period provides recent and relevant examples of executive–legislative interactions. The sample also includes selected parliamentary reports, committee recommendations, and major legislative acts where the legislature attempted to exercise oversight or influence executive actions. Additionally, prominent cases of cooperation or conflict between the executive and legislature, such as debates over constitutional amendments or major policy legislation, are included to illustrate broader institutional dynamics.

### **Data Collection**

Data are collected using multiple sources to ensure triangulation:

- **Primary sources:** Parliamentary proceedings, committee reports, constitutional texts, and official government documents provide information on formal mechanisms of oversight and legislative authority.
- **Secondary sources:** Scholarly articles, books, policy papers, and credible media reports provide context and highlight informal power dynamics, including civil–military relations and party politics.
- **Archival analysis:** Historical records of executive–legislative interactions are reviewed to identify patterns of cooperation, conflict, and institutional adaptation over time.

### **DATA ANALYSIS**

Collected data are analyzed through thematic content analysis, identifying recurring themes, patterns, and deviations in executive–legislative relations. This includes coding instances of executive dominance, legislative assertiveness, committee effectiveness, and political negotiation. The analysis distinguishes between formal institutional powers and actual political practices, helping to explain how legislative autonomy is both enabled and constrained in Pakistan’s hybrid regime.

### **Ethical Considerations**

The study observes strict ethical standards, including accurate representation of sources, avoidance of bias, and proper citation of all materials. Transparency in data collection and analysis is maintained, ensuring the credibility and validity of findings. Triangulation of multiple sources further strengthens the reliability of the research.

### **Analysis & Discussion**

#### **Executive Dominance and Legislative Oversight**

A central feature of executive–legislative relations in Pakistan is the persistent dominance of the executive branch over parliamentary oversight, which significantly constrains the legislature’s ability to function as

an effective check on government authority. Although the Constitution formally empowers parliament to question ministers, review policies, and scrutinize public expenditures, these mechanisms are often employed in a largely symbolic manner. Evidence from the 15th National Assembly indicates that legislators tend to prioritize party loyalty, leadership directives, and political survival over their institutional responsibilities. As a result, oversight practices frequently lack depth, consistency, and follow-through, weakening parliament's role in holding the executive accountable.

This imbalance is further reflected in parliamentary debates and committee proceedings, which often mirror predetermined political positions rather than substantive policy evaluation or independent scrutiny. The executive is thus able to exert significant influence over legislative agendas, control voting outcomes through party discipline, and advance key policy decisions with limited resistance. Consequently, the effectiveness of legislative oversight in Pakistan depends less on the existence of constitutional powers and more on the broader political context, including institutional maturity, intra-party democracy, and the willingness of legislators to assert autonomy in practice. Without sustained political will and collective parliamentary resolve, executive dominance continues to undermine the legislature's oversight function (Afzal, Khan, & Rafeeq, 2025).

### **Senate's Role and Institutional Constraints**

The Senate of Pakistan was originally designed to function as a stabilizing and balancing institution within the bicameral parliamentary system, particularly by safeguarding provincial interests and contributing to effective oversight of the executive. Constitutional reforms such as the Eighteenth Amendment significantly enhanced the Senate's formal authority, especially in areas related to legislation and accountability. However, in practice, the upper house continues to face difficulties in translating these constitutional powers into meaningful influence. While senators can raise questions, initiate debates, and participate in committee reviews, these mechanisms often remain procedurally constrained and politically conditioned. Party alignments, coalition considerations, and limited enforcement capacity reduce the Senate's ability to challenge executive decisions independently. As a result, executive accountability through the Senate tends to rely more on political negotiation than institutional strength. This persistent gap between constitutional empowerment and practical effectiveness highlights deeper structural weaknesses within Pakistan's parliamentary system, where formal reforms alone have not been sufficient to rebalance executive-legislative relations (Ahmad & Qamar, 2024; Hassan, Alam, & Khan, 2023).

### **Parliamentary Committees and Oversight Effectiveness**

Parliamentary committees in Pakistan play a crucial role in bridging the gap between broad legislative mandates and the detailed oversight of executive performance. By design, committees allow legislators to examine policies, budgets, and administrative actions more closely than is possible in plenary sessions, offering a platform for in-depth discussion and analysis. Recent research indicates that the number of committee meetings and legislative activities has increased, reflecting a growing institutional recognition of their importance in enhancing parliamentary oversight. This suggests that, at least in formal terms, there is an effort to make committees an active part of the legislative process, capable of contributing to informed decision-making and accountability.

Despite this potential, the effectiveness of parliamentary committees remains constrained by several structural and political factors. Members are often chosen based on party loyalty rather than expertise in specific policy areas, limiting the committee's ability to provide meaningful technical or policy analysis. In addition, committees frequently lack adequate research support, staffing, and access to comprehensive data, which hinders their capacity to scrutinize executive proposals thoroughly. Political pressures and the

dominance of party hierarchies further restrict their autonomy, with committee recommendations sometimes being sidelined or ignored. Consequently, while committees theoretically serve as a critical mechanism for legislative oversight, in practice their influence is uneven and often insufficient to counterbalance executive authority (Orakzai, 2025).

### **Delegated Legislation and Executive Authority**

Delegated legislation represents an important yet sensitive intersection between executive authority and legislative responsibility, as it allows the executive to formulate detailed rules within a framework approved by parliament. In principle, this arrangement is intended to ensure administrative efficiency and policy flexibility, particularly in complex and technical areas where legislative micromanagement may be impractical. However, in Pakistan, the extensive use of delegated authority has often reduced parliament's direct involvement in shaping regulatory outcomes. When oversight mechanisms such as committee review, debate, and follow-up reporting are weak or inconsistently applied, executive agencies gain considerable discretion in defining policy content. This situation is further compounded by limited technical expertise within parliamentary committees and a lack of sustained political interest in scrutinizing secondary legislation. As a result, delegated legislation frequently becomes a tool that expands executive influence rather than a cooperative governance mechanism. This pattern demonstrates how routine procedural practices, if left unchecked, can gradually shift the balance of power away from the legislature and reinforce executive dominance in policy implementation (Farooq & Abbasi, 2025).

### **Case Example: Constitutional Amendments and Power Politics**

Concrete examples from Pakistan's recent constitutional history further highlight the persistent imbalance in executive–legislative relations. The passage of the Twenty-seventh Amendment to the Constitution in 2025 illustrates how executive preferences can dominate the legislative process, even on issues with far-reaching institutional consequences. Although the amendment formally moved through established parliamentary procedures, including committee scrutiny and floor debate, the substance and direction of the reform largely reflected executive priorities. Parliamentary discussions were shaped more by political alignments and coalition interests than by sustained deliberation over constitutional principles or long-term governance implications. This episode underscores how legislative approval can become a procedural formality rather than an expression of independent institutional judgment. When strong political consensus exists around executive initiatives, parliament often acts as a ratifying body instead of a critical forum for debate and revision. Such cases demonstrate that in Pakistan's hybrid political setting, legislative consent does not necessarily equate to legislative autonomy, reinforcing executive dominance within the constitutional framework (Parliament of Pakistan, 2025).

### **Hybrid Regime Context and Informal Power Dynamics**

Beyond formal constitutional arrangements, Pakistan's experience as a hybrid regime demonstrates that executive–legislative relations cannot be fully understood through legal provisions alone. While the Constitution outlines clear roles for parliament in lawmaking and oversight, these formal rules operate alongside deeply embedded informal practices that shape political behavior. Party hierarchies often determine legislative conduct, limiting individual autonomy and discouraging dissent against executive leadership. Coalition politics further complicate this environment, as legislative support is frequently negotiated through informal agreements rather than institutional debate. In such settings, parliamentary procedures may exist in form, but their substance is diluted by behind-the-scenes bargaining and elite consensus-building, reducing the legislature's ability to assert itself as an independent actor (Ahmad & Qamar, 2024).



At the same time, the influence of unelected institutions and long-standing power structures adds another layer to these informal dynamics. Military influence, bureaucratic discretion, and elite networks frequently intersect with civilian governance, shaping policy outcomes without direct parliamentary involvement. As a result, even when parliament possesses the authority to question or challenge executive actions, political realities often encourage accommodation rather than confrontation. This tendency reinforces a pattern in which legislative bodies cooperate with or defer to the executive to maintain political stability or access to power. These dynamics illustrate that meaningful legislative oversight in Pakistan depends not only on constitutional empowerment but also on addressing the informal power relations that continue to shape the country's hybrid political order (Afzal et al., 2025).

### **Implications for Democratic Accountability and Governance**

Taken together, this analysis shows that executive–legislative relations in Pakistan are not shaped by constitutional design alone, but by the interaction of formal rules with political incentives and the broader realities of a hybrid regime. While the Constitution formally empowers parliament to legislate, debate, and oversee executive conduct, these powers are often constrained by weak institutional capacity and political dependence. Legislators frequently operate within party-centered structures that prioritize loyalty over accountability, limiting the scope for independent oversight. As a result, the legislature's role tends to be reactive rather than assertive, responding to executive initiatives instead of shaping policy agendas. This imbalance reflects a system in which legal authority exists on paper, but practical influence remains uneven and conditional.

Improving executive–legislative relations, therefore, requires more than symbolic reforms or the expansion of formal powers. Meaningful change depends on strengthening parliamentary institutions through better research support, procedural clarity, and protection for legislative independence. Equally important is cultivating a political culture that values debate, transparency, and accountability over short-term political gains. Without sustained political commitment to these principles, constitutional provisions alone are unlikely to translate into balanced governance. Enhancing legislative autonomy would allow parliament to more fully embody its constitutional role, contributing to democratic accountability and a more stable distribution of power within Pakistan's political system.

### **CONCLUSION**

This study has shown that executive–legislative relations in Pakistan are shaped by a persistent imbalance rooted in the country's hybrid political structure. Although the Constitution grants parliament significant powers of oversight and lawmaking, these formal authorities are often overshadowed by executive dominance, party discipline, and informal power networks. The legislature frequently endorses executive initiatives rather than independently shaping policy, limiting its role as an effective check on government authority. At the same time, institutions such as parliamentary committees and the Senate demonstrate that space for meaningful legislative engagement does exist, even if it remains underutilized. The findings suggest that Pakistan's executive–legislative relationship is not simply dysfunctional but reflects deeper structural and political constraints characteristic of hybrid regimes. Strengthening this relationship requires more than constitutional reform; it demands enhanced institutional capacity, greater legislative autonomy, and a political culture that values accountability. Without such changes, the promise of balanced governance is likely to remain more aspirational than real.

## **POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **1. Strengthening Parliamentary Committees**

Parliamentary committees should be equipped with permanent research staff, policy analysts, and legal experts to support informed scrutiny of executive actions. Regular training programs for committee members can enhance their technical understanding and oversight capacity.

### **2. Reducing Excessive Party Control**

Internal parliamentary rules should be reformed to allow legislators greater autonomy in questioning and debating executive policies. Limiting rigid party discipline, especially on oversight matters, can encourage independent legislative behavior and accountability.

### **3. Enhancing Transparency and Senate Oversight**

The executive should be required to share policy decisions, delegated legislation, and budgetary details on time for parliamentary review. At the same time, the Senate's role in monitoring federal governance should be strengthened through clearer follow-up and reporting mechanisms.

### **4. Institutionalizing Executive Accountability Mechanisms**

Regular and mandatory appearances of ministers before parliament should be strictly enforced, particularly during question hours and committee hearings. Clear timelines for responding to parliamentary queries and implementing committee recommendations can help ensure that executive accountability is not symbolic but substantive.

### **5. Promoting a Culture of Constitutionalism and Legislative Independence**

Long-term improvement requires cultivating respect for parliamentary authority through civic education, media engagement, and political leadership. Encouraging debate, dissent, and rule-based decision-making within parliament can gradually strengthen legislative independence and balance executive power.

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