

**Conditionality and Compliance: The Efficacy of European Union Human Rights Provisions as Mechanisms of Influence in The Indo-Pacific**

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**Received:** 17-10-2025

**Revised:** 20-11-2025

**Accepted:** 29-11-2025

**Published:** 15-12-2025

## **ABSTRACT**

*This paper analyses the efficacy of European Union human rights clauses as mechanisms of influence in the Indo-Pacific region, emphasizing the interplay between conditionality and compliance. Human rights clauses are now a common part of EU agreements with other countries. This shows that the EU is committed to spreading universal ideals beyond its own borders. Nonetheless, their genuine influence on the conduct of partner states remains debated, especially in geopolitically complex regions like the Indo-Pacific. Drawing on the theoretical framework of Normative Power Europe and compliance-oriented methodologies in international law, this research assesses whether EU human rights conditionality engenders substantive behavioral change or remains predominantly symbolic. The paper examines the legislative framework of EU human rights provisions, the geopolitical and economic factors influencing EU involvement in the Indo-Pacific, and the actual use of conditionality in both bilateral and regional settings. It also examines compliance outcomes by analyzing how communication, incentives, fines, and selective enforcement interact. The results show that EU human rights clauses help set the agenda and spread norms, but they aren't as effective because of geopolitical competition, unequal dependency, and the EU's unwillingness to risk important ties. The article suggests that EU human rights conditionality primarily serves as a mechanism for normative signaling rather than coercive influence, necessitating recalibration to enhance credibility and efficacy in the Indo-Pacific.*

**Keywords:** European Union; Human Rights Clauses; Normative Power Europe; Conditionality; Compliance; Indo-Pacific; Geopolitics; Norm Diffusion

## **INTRODUCTION**

Advancing human rights is a key aspect of the European Union's foreign policy. The EU's treaties and policy frameworks reflect its commitment to human rights, democracy, and the rule of law, principles that also guide its interactions with other countries. One of the main methods to promote these values is human rights conditionality, particularly through clauses included in external agreements like trade, cooperation, and partnership treaties. These clauses generally designate respect for human rights as an "essential element" of each agreement, theoretically allowing the EU to suspend cooperation following serious abuses. Since the early 1990s, these articles have become standard features of EU foreign accords, signifying the EU's aspiration to be a moral power in international relations. Conditionality aims to link tangible benefits,

such as market access, development assistance, or political collaboration, to adherence to human rights standards, seeking to influence partner state behavior and promote global human rights norms.

Even though they are widely used, people still disagree on how well EU human rights clauses work. Critics say that conditionality is not always applied fairly, consistently enforced, or prioritized over strategic or commercial considerations. Supporters, on the other hand, say that human rights clauses give people a formal way to talk, keep an eye on things, and spread norms over time, even when consequences aren't in place. In the Indo-Pacific area, where geopolitical competition is growing, economies are becoming more interdependent, and there are many different political systems, these disputes are very important. The EU has made the Indo-Pacific a strategic priority, with important partners including India, Japan, ASEAN member states, and Pacific Island countries. At the same time, the region faces serious human rights problems, including restrictions on civil liberties, breaches of minority rights, and a decline in democracy. This paper examines EU human rights conditionality within a complex regional framework, questioning whether human rights clauses serve as effective instruments of influence or merely symbolic endorsements of EU values.

### **The Study's Scope**

This paper examines the functions and effectiveness of EU human rights clauses within the framework of the EU's involvement in the Indo-Pacific. It includes South Asia, Southeast Asia, East Asia, and the Pacific, with a focus on EU accords and relationships with ASEAN, individual Indo-Pacific states, and regional institutions. The article looks at the human rights provisions in EU trade and cooperation agreements, political partnership frameworks, and development cooperation tools. The analysis is confined to the post-Cold War era, focusing on advancements from the 1990s onwards, when human rights conditionality was institutionalized in EU external action. Although particular country examples are cited for illustrative purposes, the study lacks comprehensive case studies of individual states. Instead, it uses a conceptual and analytical approach to examine how things are done, how well they are followed, and the limits in the Indo-Pacific region.

### **Importance of The Study**

This study helps readers identify the gap between the EU's normative ambitions and its practical influence in external relations. By addressing the Indo-Pacific—an increasingly strategic region marked by normative competition—the paper analyzes a neglected aspect of EU human rights policy. Researchers in international relations, EU studies, and human rights law, as well as policymakers focused on external governance and diplomacy, should find the results relevant. The study clarifies how conditionality operates in multipolar contexts, especially when the EU faces strong competition and lacks predominant influence. By analyzing compliance dynamics and setting boundaries, the article advances debate about the credibility, consistency, and future development of EU human rights conditionality. Ultimately, it adds to broader conversations about whether normative power can drive real behavioral change amid complex geopolitics.

### **Reason**

This research addresses the persistent conflict between the EU's self-perception as a human rights defender and the uneven impact it achieves abroad. While EU accords often include human rights provisions, we still do not fully understand how these clauses shape the behavior of partner governments—particularly where the EU represents neither the dominant economic nor security entity. The Indo-Pacific exemplifies this dilemma, as regional states frequently diversify their partnerships and pursue strategic alternatives.

This study aims to rigorously evaluate the relevance and efficacy of EU human rights conditionality in the current context. By combining legal analysis with international relations theory, the study seeks to transcend mere descriptive narratives and offer a sophisticated evaluation of conditionality as an instrument of influence. The research is driven by the need to reevaluate current instruments and explore avenues to improve their efficacy in an evolving global order.

### **Research Questions**

1. How are the human rights clauses of the European Union legally set up and put into action in agreements with Indo-Pacific partner states?
2. How much do these human rights clauses affect how well people follow international human rights standards and cause changes in behavior that can be seen in the Indo-Pacific region?
3. How do strategic, economic, and geopolitical variables influence the European Union's selection and efficacy of enforcement instruments, such as dialogue, incentives, and restrictive measures?

### **Research Objectives**

- To look at the legal and policy bases of the European Union's human rights conditionality in its agreements with other countries.
- To evaluate the practical application and efficacy of EU human rights provisions in promoting compliance and behavioral transformation among Indo-Pacific partner nations.
- To examine the influence of structural and geopolitical limitations on EU enforcement methods and to suggest measures for improving the legitimacy and efficacy of EU human rights conditionality in the Indo-Pacific area.

## **REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE**

### **Human Rights Conditionality in The Eu's Relations with Other Countries**

Human rights conditionality has long defined the European Union's foreign policy. By making human rights articles "essential elements" of trade and cooperation agreements, the Union demonstrates its intent to promote democratic values, the rule of law, and fundamental freedoms internationally (Bartels, 2005). Researchers contend that these clauses give the EU a legal and political basis for advancing human rights through dialogue, incentives, and, where necessary, restrictions. Evidence shows that the effectiveness of conditionality stems not only from its legal structure but also from consistent implementation in various geopolitical settings (Smith, 2014).

### **Normative Power Europe and The Externalisation Of Values**

A significant corpus of academic work contextualizes EU human rights conditionality within the theoretical paradigm of Normative Power Europe. Ian Manners (2002) characterizes the EU as an entity whose impact is predominantly derived from its capacity to shape norms, rather than from military or coercive power. People think that human rights clauses are important tools for spreading EU norms worldwide. Later studies improved this method by linking normative power to the institutional and legal tools embedded in EU accords (Manners, 2006). Critics, however, say that normative goals often conflict with strategic and economic goals, which makes the EU's value-based foreign policy less credible and consistent.

### **Adherence, Efficacy, And Behavioural Transformation**

The literature on compliance offers divergent evaluations of the EU's ability to effect behavioral change via human rights conditionality. Borel and Risse (2012) claim that EU influence is most effective when domestic circumstances in partner states are favorable to reform, as exemplified by the presence of supportive political elites or engaged civil society organizations. Conversely, in situations of significant domestic resistance, conditionality often leads to ceremonial or symbolic compliance rather than meaningful advancements. These results indicate that EU human rights clauses serve more effectively as instruments for agenda-setting and socialization than as direct enforcement mechanisms.

### **Eu Human Rights Conditionality in The Indo-Pacific Setting**

Recent academic work has increasingly focused on the Indo-Pacific since the EU adopted its regional strategy. Studies underscore the region's political variety and sensitivity to sovereignty, complicating the implementation of human rights conditionality (European Commission, 2021). Some researchers argue that the EU's strategic goals, such as trade, connectivity, and balancing competition between major powers, make it less likely to enforce human rights provisions rigorously (Youngs, 2019). Some argue that sustained participation and institutionalized debate can foster normative convergence over time, even in difficult political contexts.

### **Studies Based On Cases and Real-Life Examples**

Empirical studies investigating EU relations with Indo-Pacific allies, including Vietnam, Myanmar, and the Philippines, yield mixed results. Trade incentives and discussion procedures have led to some legal and institutional changes, but ongoing human rights abuses show that the EU's ability to make changes is limited (Borel et al., 2017). These differing results show how important it is to consider context and how dangerous it is to make overly broad generalizations about the effectiveness of EU conditionality.

### **Research Gap**

In general, the literature provides useful insights into the political, legal, and moral aspects of EU human rights conditionality. Nonetheless, there is a lack of comprehensive assessments that integrate normative power theory, legal frameworks, and regional geopolitics to evaluate effectiveness specifically in the Indo-Pacific. This study fills this gap by providing a comprehensive, context-sensitive look at EU human rights clauses as tools of persuasion.

### **Theoretical and Conceptual Framework: Normative Power Europe and Compliance Mechanisms**

#### **Normative Power Europe**

Normative Power Europe (NPE) is a key theoretical framework for examining how the European Union (EU) uses human rights conditionality. Ian Manners proposed that the EU's power in the world stems less from its military or coercive capacities and more from its ability to define norms, values, and standards of appropriate behavior in international relations (Manners, 2002). The EU's external actions are based on core values like human rights, democracy, the rule of law, and respect for international law. These values are clearly stated in the Union's constitution, especially Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union. In this context, human rights provisions included in EU external agreements serve as institutionalized manifestations of normative authority. Instead of using force to make partner states follow EU-promoted norms, these clauses try to get them to embrace and internalize them. Academics contend that this modality

of influence aims to produce enduring changes in political behavior by integrating normative expectations into legal and diplomatic frameworks (Manners, 2006).

### **Human Rights Conditionality as A Normative Tool**

Human rights conditionality is the idea that political, economic, or development cooperation should only happen if human rights and democratic values are respected. In EU external relations, conditionality mostly works through "essential elements" clauses. These clauses legally require partner states to uphold key ideals to continue working together. From a normative power standpoint, conditionality functions not solely as a punitive instrument but as a method to bolster collective standards and promote adherence through debate, incentives, and reputational factors (Smith, 2014).

The EU's conditionality is based more on legitimacy and persuasion than on force, unlike the classic realist methods it focuses on. Thus, compliance is expected to arise from norm diffusion and institutional learning rather than from direct behavioral enforcement. This strategy shows that the EU prefers slow, cooperative approaches to achieving its goals.

### **Ways to Get People to Follow the Rules: From Rewards to Socialisation**

The literature delineates various strategies by which EU human rights conditionality aims to foster compliance. One important way is through material incentives, such as access to markets, development aid, and trade agreements that favor one country over another. These incentives can prompt partner states to make changes in the hope of receiving political or economic rewards. But material incentives alone are not enough to bring about lasting transformation. A second mechanism is socialization, which occurs when people come into contact with one another, talk to each other, and repeatedly engage with institutions, helping them internalize norms over time. Borel and Risse (2012) contend that socialization is most effective when domestic actors regard EU norms as legitimate and congruent with local political situations. In many instances, compliance transforms into a self-reinforcing mechanism rather than being externally enforced.

A third way is through pressure on reputation. Being part of the EU is seen as a good thing, and failing to follow the rules could hurt your reputation both in your region and around the world. This kind of pressure is indirect, but it can nevertheless change how elites act, especially in countries that want to be seen as legitimate by the rest of the world.

### **Restrictions of Normative Power and Conditionality**

The normative power paradigm has been heavily criticized, even if it is an interesting idea. Scholars contend that the EU's dependence on conditionality is compromised by inconsistent enforcement and conflicting strategic aims (Youngs, 2019). Applying human rights terms only in certain places, such as the Indo-Pacific, where they are strategically relevant, raises concerns about trustworthiness and double standards.

Also, the normative effect is limited by the political circumstances in the partner states. When ruling elites view EU demands as intrusive or misaligned with national interests, resistance to compliance is likely. These restrictions indicate that normative authority functions within distinct structural and geographical boundaries.

### **The Legal Framework of the European Union's Human Rights Clauses in External Agreements**

The legal framework for human rights clauses in the European Union (EU) is based on the Union's constitution and treaty-based duties. The Treaty on European Union (TEU) says in Articles 2 and 21 that the EU's internal and external actions should be guided by respect for human rights, democracy, the rule of law, and basic freedoms. These articles not only set out moral obligations, but they also make it legally necessary for the EU to take human rights into account when dealing with third countries. Consequently, human rights conditionality has become a regular part of the EU's agreements with other countries. This shows that the EU wants to ensure its foreign policy tools align with its core ideals.

Most of the time, human rights clauses are included in EU trade agreements, Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs), Association Agreements, and development cooperation frameworks. Most of the time, these articles are written as "essential elements" provisions, which means that respecting human rights and democratic values is a basic part of the agreement. This wording gives human rights duties a major role in the contract, allowing the EU to respond to serious infringements without officially ending the deal. The essential elements clause provides the law with a fair way to respond, such as through consultations, partial suspension of benefits, or the application of restriction measures, as Bartels (2005) points out.

A fundamental part of its legal framework is its focus on graduated and procedural enforcement. Instead of immediately taking disciplinary action, EU accords normally provide for talks and dialogue channels first. These steps are meant to give partner states a chance to voice their concerns and demonstrate their willingness to follow the rules. The suspension of cooperation is clearly stated to be a last resort, indicating that the EU prefers discussion and persuasion to coercion. This approach emphasizes the normative justification of EU conditionality, which aims to promote behavioral transformation through collaboration rather than conflict.

EU accords set up institutionalized dialogue frameworks, such as joint committees, subcommittees on human rights, and regular political talks, in addition to suspension mechanisms. These groups have many different jobs, such as ensuring rules are followed, making it easier to share information, and providing a place to discuss human rights issues in an organized way. The inclusion of these tools shows that EU human rights conditionality is a mix of legally enforceable commitments and continuing political engagement. The EU can maintain its normative expectations while still changing how they are implemented through both hard and soft law tools.

The EU's Generalized Scheme of Preferences Plus (GSP+) is a highly advanced example of conditionality built into the law. Under the GSP+ system, countries that benefit from it must sign and fully execute a set of important international agreements on human rights, labor standards, environmental protection, and good governance. To keep getting preferential trade privileges, companies must follow the rules, which are checked through regular reports and conversations. This model shows how economic incentives might strengthen legal commitments by raising the penalty for noncompliance and giving the EU greater power (Smith, 2014). The EU's focus on monitoring and engagement shows that it is serious about working together to follow the rules.

Even while the EU's human rights rules are legally strict, they have a lot of room for interpretation when it comes to enforcement. It is essentially a political decision whether to apply suspension clauses or impose restrictions, and all EU institutions and member states must agree on these decisions. As a result, enforcement is often affected by broader strategic, economic, and geopolitical factors. This freedom has drawn criticism for being inconsistent and selective, especially in areas of great strategic importance, such as the Indo-Pacific.

Also, the efficiency of the legal framework depends on how EU rules interact with the legal and political systems of partner states. Human rights articles impose formal responsibilities at the international level; nevertheless, their implementation domestically relies on the competence of local institutions and the willingness of political entities. This gap between what the law says and what actually happens shows how limited legal conditionality is when there aren't any enabling conditions in the country.

In general, the EU's human rights framework provides a strong moral and institutional basis for promoting human rights in contacts with other countries. The EU's unique approach to conditionality is evident in its mix of legal commitments, procedural safeguards, and avenues for people to engage with one another. But the success of this framework depends on how well it is used, how much political will there is, and the larger strategic situation in which these legal tools work.

### **European Union Policy Goals and Strategic Interests in The Indo-Pacific Region**

The EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific (European Commission, 2021) shows that the Indo-Pacific area is now a strategic focus for EU foreign policy. The EU is involved in this region due to its economic growth, geopolitical importance, and its vital role in global trade routes. The EU has also tried to include its normative goals, such as promoting human rights, into its regional strategy. The EU has several different goals for its policies in the Indo-Pacific. The EU wants to diversify trade ties, protect supply chains, and open new markets through bilateral and regional trade agreements. The EU wants to strengthen multilateralism, support a rules-based international order, and promote political stability. Within this larger strategic framework, human rights conditionality is seen as a complementary goal rather than the main one. But having both normative commitments and strategic goals simultaneously creates difficulties. A measured approach is needed when working with states that have different political systems, from liberal democracies to authoritarian regimes. Researchers say the EU often prioritizes engagement and communication over confrontation to sustain long-term partnerships (Youngs, 2019). This practical approach shapes how human rights clauses are implemented in the area. Still, the inclusion of human rights clauses in all EU Indo-Pacific agreements shows that the Union wants to maintain its norms. Even when enforcement is careful, these articles make human rights a part of diplomatic talks and institutional frameworks. This strengthens the EU's character as a values-based actor.

### **Putting Human Rights Conditionality into Action**

In the Indo-Pacific, the EU uses a mix of engagement, incentives, monitoring, and selective pressure to implement human rights conditionality. The main way to get involved is through human rights dialogues, which provide people a chance to voice their concerns, share information, and push for changes. These talks are often supported by development aid aimed at improving governance and institutions' ability to do their jobs.

Trade agreements are another important way to make things happen. Agreements with nations like Vietnam and the Philippines include language about human rights as well as economic cooperation. For GSP+, the EU has used monitoring and reporting systems to assess whether countries are complying with international agreements. They have tied trade benefits to showing progress. Selective use of restrictive measures, such as sanctions and the cessation of cooperation, has been made. The EU's approach to Myanmar shows how enforcement may work and where it can fail. It used both targeted sanctions and diplomatic pressure. Even though these kinds of actions are strongly disapproved of, they don't always make people follow the rules.

In general, the EU prefers to exert a gradual influence rather than resort to forceful enforcement. Human rights conditionality serves as a process-oriented mechanism, aiming to influence institutional practices and policy dialogue progressively rather than to ensure immediate adherence.

### **Assessing Effectiveness**

To figure out how well EU human rights conditionality works, you need to separate formal compliance, behavioral change, and normative alignment. Indo-Pacific empirical evidence indicates inconsistent results. In several instances, conditionality has facilitated legal reforms, the ratification of international treaties, and improved institutional interaction. These changes show that people are partially following human rights norms and becoming more involved with them. Nonetheless, significant behavioral change is constrained in environments characterized by robust domestic political opposition. Borel and Risse (2012) contend that EU influence is most efficacious when domestic entities regard EU norms as legitimate and aligned with local interests. In the absence of this criterion, compliance is often merely symbolic. Even with these problems, the EU's human rights elements have worked well as tools for defining the agenda. The EU ensures that human rights are always part of accords, especially in difficult political situations. This indirect influence bolsters the claim that performance should be assessed not only by immediate results but also by enduring normative consequences.

### **Geopolitical and Structural Limits On the Eu's Ability to Protect Human Rights**

Structural and geopolitical reasons limit the EU's ability to protect human rights in the Indo-Pacific. The region's sensitivity to sovereignty and non-interference makes it less open to conditionality from other sources. Also, the presence of other partners makes the EU less powerful, allowing states to use strategic diversity to counter normative pressure.

Geopolitical competition makes enforcement even harder. The EU's commitment to engagement and multilateralism often mitigates its readiness to implement punitive measures. This practical approach, which keeps partnerships together, can hurt the legitimacy of conditionality. There are also important internal EU limits. Different goals among Member States and complicated institutions might lead to inconsistent usage of human rights articles. These limitations highlight the inherent restrictions of normative power within a contentious geopolitical context.

### **RECOMMENDATIONS**

Several policy suggestions come to mind to improve the effectiveness of human rights conditionality in the Indo-Pacific.

First, the EU should ensure that human rights clauses are consistently enforced across all relationships. More openness in decision-making would make it more believable.

Second, the EU should invest in more effective ways to monitor progress, such as clearer benchmarks and stronger mechanisms to assess compliance.

This would make it easier to make more objective judgments and less likely for people to think the process is selective.

## **CONCLUSION**

This study has analyzed the efficacy of EU human rights clauses as mechanisms of influence in the Indo-Pacific, contextualizing them within the overarching concept of normative power in Europe. The data show that human rights conditionality doesn't always lead to quick changes in behavior, but it does have a significant impact on how institutions operate, how policies are discussed, and how norms align over time.

The EU's legislative framework provides a strong basis for advancing human rights, but its effectiveness is influenced by strategic interests, domestic political factors, and geographical constraints. In the Indo-Pacific, human rights conditionality primarily operates through discourse, incentives, and socialization rather than coercion.

Even though it has some problems, EU human rights conditionality strengthens the Union's character as a normative actor and helps spread values over time. Consequently, its impact should be perceived as cumulative and process-oriented. Strengthening consistency, monitoring, and regional participation can make it more successful and ensure that human rights remain central to EU Indo-Pacific ties.

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