### Reasons Weak Enforceability of International Law with Case Studies

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#### **ABSTRACT**

The international legal system, which is meant to regulate the relations between independent states, is subject to the constant doubts concerning the ability of the international law to enforce compliance. The international norms are not based on the centralized enforcement as is common with domestic systems, but on the voluntary involvement of states, decentralized application, and collective actions that usually involve power asymmetry and political goals. This paper discusses the structural factors that lead to a weak enforcement, such as lack of centralized enforcement authority, primacy of state sovereignty, unequal enforcement between powerful and weaker states and fragmentation of enforcement mechanisms, and discusses how they undermine the perceived effectiveness of international law. The analysis of theoretical solutions and practical examples (such as the 2022-2021 conflict in Ukraine, the arbitration process in South China Sea, and the work of the UN peacekeeping missions) will show that the use of power politics and institutional limitations do not allow achieving complete enforcement but the normative role of law that regulates the behavior of states will continue to function. The analysis examines other compliance instruments, including positive incentives, targeted countermeasures, and legal deterrence of the gray-zone behavior, and maps out the reform directions, including procedural changes to decision-blocking in the global security organizations, increased financial incentives, and better monitoring technologies. Using more than 100 sources (academic, policy, and official documents), the paper concludes that pragmatic institutional reforms and enforcement gaps should not be expected to get better, although the latter remains possible.

**Keywords:** International Legal System; Enforcement of International Law; State Sovereignty; Power Asymmetry; Compliance Mechanisms; International Conflicts and Arbitration; UN Peacekeeping; Institutional Reform and Global Governance

#### INTRODUCTION

The inquiries regarding the real life application of those rules that govern the relations between independent countries have existed since the beginning of the organized interactions between the countries. Being regarded as an institution that has limited actual authority, these guidelines work in a globe where there is no ultimate authority, and countries are the main actors and are not provided with the structured controls that the local juristic frameworks, such as mandatory hearings or special enforcers, tend to offer. This analysis gives a keen insight into the limitations to the implementation of such global standards, exploring their very roots, real-life events and potential solutions. Based on the expert opinions on legal spheres, discussions, and works published during the period of 2009 to today, it is aimed to provide a complete picture that goes beyond the superficial judgments and highlights the practical ways of improvement. Most simply, these norms entail agreements, established traditions, and broad concepts that guide national behavior in spheres such as business transactions, personal protection, environmental protection, and conflicts that involve use of force. Their implementation, however, depends on organizations like global

safety councils, dispute resolution tribunals, and special review calls, all of which have a ceiling of rejection rights, range constraints and the need to volunteer. Questioners point to such obvious neglects as territorial incursions in Europe since 2022, operations in troubled regions that have given rise to serious accusations, and the constraint of activities induced by leading markets on new zones, as signs of systemic vices. Proponents of these policies argue that the worth of these guidelines lies not only in its ability to coerce compliance but as world discussions, give purpose to decision making and a foundation of collective action.

This expanded review is established in different key segments to be explored in detail. We begin by tracing the implementation problems to their development and idea-based origins, combining new and old perspectives between the strength-focused, joint-effort, identity-building, and the choice-making perspectives. Then, we examine key factors behind limited implementation taking off of things such as the non-existence of a unified controller, independence concepts, strength disparities, sporadic applications and motivation to adhere to rules. Subsequently, the closer examination of the real-life examples is made based on the events that occurred not so long ago as of the present, including topical issues in Europe and Middle East and the emergence of new strains, to outline the practical outcomes. Secondly, we discuss the support of these guidelines and other strategies, including encouragements, responses, and changes in a spreadpower environment. A new section of the recent challenges introduces recent developments and expert opinions. There is an additional section that is concerned with mixed threats and ways of rule-based prevention. An appendix on recommended changes, particularly to rejection systems in safety groups, combines proposals of the past few years. Finally, we come to greater consequences of the route to global principles, highlighting. in a connected time, which encompasses weather variations and technological releases. By this mixing, it is meant to show how despite the barriers still present in its implementation, active modifications and new subsequent strategies can strengthen the stability of the structure. The review adopts the mixed sources to guarantee an objective perspective, including ideas of developed and emerging regions. With current events, including the rise in the divisions of the approaches to be used with particular guides and the growth of latent aggressions, the demand to update the situation has become more acute. We also explore the intersection of these problems with climate

emergencies to add more depth, how commitments such as warmth caps face similar issues that follow due to varying country capabilities and priorities. The holistic approach reveals interconnected areas of weakness of global management. Additionally, the role of external actors and social forces in pushing responsible layers of implementation layers the dynamics of action, often filling the gaps of inaction by the country. As an illustration, legal avenues have increasingly been used by support networks to challenge holds in nature protection, which demonstrates a ground-level push instrument. Trends such as these suggest that even though country based arrangements dominate, broader participation can act as a rejuvenator of implementation efforts. When examining them, the focus is to relate ideological discussions to actual outcomes as a guide to decision-makers who need to deal with an evolving environment.

#### Historical and Theoretical Background

Problems in the implementation of global guidelines are traced back to the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia establishing national self-sufficiency and absence of external intervention, creating a diffused global system. This arrangement emphasized mutual grants of approval between equals though preserved disparities of previous controls. Early philosophers took logical laws and pushed them further with the higher laws, whereby nations could follow based on moral obligations. However, the shift of factual scenery in the 19th century under exerting influence of directive notions by leaders, observed global guidelines to be fundamental codes of morality lacking a judge of these codes. During the previous century, conceptions of clean legal configurations had situated worldwide guidelines as the result of country sanctions, and they also observed their restraining boundaries. After massive confrontations, elementary texts have attempted

to concentrate implementation by safety groups, yet privileges of key individuals have frequently halted amalgamated responses with display on area crises in blocks. Installing the responsibility instruments on individuals were milestones in individual accountability, albeit their incompleteness as they omit large movers, portray a long-term lack. More recently, these groups face additional pressures of restrictive steps and resistances that emphasize continuing implementation pressures. Idea-based setups provide important perspectives on actualizing and enforcement. The strength-based sights are based on ancient discussions on control and regard guidelines as struggles to be under control. Experts assert that nations only follow but matching is not constrained using rules. Joint structures emphasize teams on cutting the cost of deals and creating win-win. The thoughts that shape identity bring out the processes through which country self-views and priorities are shaped and result in ordinary following by blending. According to choice-making models, the nations compare image, mutual, or corrective costs to deviation gains. This is implemented on scattered limits and reply risks break the implementation. Behavior insights introduce the mental sides displaying the responses to slants and sight of fairness. As an example, the concepts of validity say that the rules considered to be fair and fairly constructed attract more followers. Skepticism is another contributor to implementation issues. The content of questions on legal character is to be found in groups because of soft implementation and no personal coverage being required, as well as an emphasis on influencing the standards. Where local will impose levels, the global level will be based on flat approvals which may be picked. In spread influence organizations, the emergent influencers challenge the governing standards, and it may break the implementation, but expands methods as well. Urging part studies reveal that international guidelines implement push through self-support, balances, and picture worries, but not central fines. The push is evident in the attempts of nations to legalize breaks, to ensure that normative strength is valid. This is congruent to defenses in which even breakers are made to support steps with language of rules indicating that the arrangement must not be cutoff. Including the perceptions of the less dominant regions, it has been critiqued that permissible financial impetuses maintain disproportionate arrangements, with robust entities ultimately undermining the autonomy of their partners. Limits were reviewed following major changes which show how the system allowed financial battles under the guise of non-push steps. These historical and conceptual sections emphasize that implementation is a spectrum that is defined by changing global trends. The influence among groups may spread such as the formation of growing partnerships which may alter or divide traditional setups. Newly revisited reviews present shifting views on guidelines and units justify why deviations are necessary, which is endangering the established order. This is to say that drops caused by dismissal perceptions will destroy after-clash arrangements. To put extra colouring on the expansion of safeguards in hostilities under middle-century treaties, sought to check animosity but was affected by execution is emptied away in uneven struggles. Widened guards are added later but non-formal players frequently disregard them. Idea extensions include perceptions on bordered matters and connections to nature agreements, in which draws on primary givers undermine organization activities. Getting deeper, the cross with the digital space introduces new obstacles, with concealed aggressions pushing the previous boundaries to respond. They are recurring, as past, examples of newness and control such as early century weapons checks. Other arguments against IDEA are the play-based mocks in which repetitive links tend to develop a belief and a follow up in the long-term. Partnerships also move in spread-power places, potentially establishing parallel standards that compete with general ones, making it more difficult to implement them uniformly. According to experts, though power changes in the past lead to conflicts, legal arrangements can diminish through provision of talk platforms. This background emphasises the adaptable nature of global norms, where they change to be more bendy and less fact-based arrangements that are responsive to diverse interests.

Weaknesses in enforcing the law. Limited implementation of global standards is caused by inherent characteristics promoting self-rule of countries rather than group priorities. We describe key components in more detail as below, with the specific divisions being explained by specialists. None of the Unified Control: Worldwide standards do not have an equivalent to the local ruling arms. Member rights are used

to stop planned central appliers on basic charters. There have been cases of numerous blocks over the years by key players that have been preventing responses to conflicts. Notes demonstrate this proliferation coming to life to individual supports, constrained by duty requirements in accountability dictates. New reports emphasize new problems with the monitoring of physical space and the adherence to self-government. Self-Rule and Approval: Equal self-rule means okay to duties, being able to be out of pacts. This selection method dilutes broad putting into practice because non-joins shirk watch. Such arrangements are advantageous to more powerful groups in making or omitting terms. In persistent regions, tracking prevents tracking, and pushback to external reviews. Strength Differences: Implementing variances of tools against less strong, one-way limits with the help of money lead, economies without back hurt. Transitions to most centers are challenging this, yet openings remain, and strong escape finds are made, as well as weak pushing. Existing evidence indicates that break in spread arrangements, deteriorate picked after. Putting In Action Spread: There are limited choices such as balances. There is mutual urging, but growth is stifled by limit. Judges in the locality can be implemented all over the world, but disproportionately. Agrements increase the indeterminate aggressions, where non-straight actions do not incur normal putting into action. After Drivers; Countries follow by picture, mutual or gain causes not fine fears. Highlights indicate good inducements such as swaps or help beat limits which usually miss and crippled the weak. The senses of fairness increase after mental models. New elements such as ambiguous common standards and an increase in unofficial players that create implementation difficult are added. Mixed partnerships may become stronger or weaker in spread power, where new influencers seek changes. These characteristics render global standards more objective than necessary, and selection occurs in the face of increasing variances. Also, political influence and international competitions divide growth which is observed in disproportionate expenditure on long-term objectives. Watch bodies are chosen, which means that it is possible to dodge when one does not want to move. Fresh works that are being widened, other legal setups begin rivalries, which reduce general putting into action. Benefits Non-following in swaps such as barriers breaking trade pacts exhibit influence overriding tools. To construct, consider the cultural differences on the standard reads, which results in different putting into action. West stresses on personal freedoms in people safeguards vary with group sights in other locations, thus rub in enforcement. Relied on money will also come into play as owed nations will be easier to pursue with calls by the lenders, which will create a bias in favor. This is aggravated by tech variances whereby a large watch tools are not evenly distributed and thus can be dodge on areas that are less set. After-control lenses develop a critique of IDEA, asserting that the existing systems perpetuate wrongdoings of the past, and enforcement is a lead maintenance mechanism. The resolution of these needs does not only fix changes in structure, but culture talks in the process of making agreement. Fact studies observe that locations with stronger bodies of areas attain improved following by integrating tools, proposing trends in global change. Enforcement in weather places has a fight with harm link where the spread makes answerability a challenge. This requires new legal instruments such as joint responsibility arrangements. All in all, these reasons are interconnected, creating the tangled net that requires the fixes of many-sides.

### **Case Studies**

In order to demonstrate barriers to implementation, we consider real-life examples of recent years. Russia Invasion of Ukraine (2022-present): The outright invasion of Ukraine that started on February 24, 2022, is a vivid act of defiance of the fundamental principles of the international law, such as the right against the use of force and the principle of state sovereignty. The UN Security council could not do collective enforcement action despite this condemnation and the resolution of the UN general assembly because Russia had the power to veto. Although the International Court of Justice (ICJ) imposed temporary actions that demanded that Russia withdraw its military actions, it has not done much. This case brings out the issue of how enforcement mechanisms of the UN Charter may be brought to a standstill in the event one of the perpetrators is a permanent member of the Security Council. The South China Sea Arbitration (2016):

The Philippines filed a multilateral court case with China in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) over its claims to the South China Sea. In July 2016, the ruling of the tribunal was overwhelming to the Philippines, rejecting the claims of China on the nine-dash line. The ruling was however rejected by China which declared it as null and void. Since the UNCLOS tribunal rulings do not have any standing enforcement mechanism, the decision did not practically affect the activities of China in the region which did not stop. This case is a classic case study of a state not obeying an unfavorable legal ruling. The U.S. Actions and the International Criminal Court: The International Criminal Court (ICC) represents a tribunal developed with the purpose of prosecuting individuals who commit the gravest crimes of the international character. Its efficiency is however hampered by the fact that key powers such as the United States are not participating. In the case where the ICC sought to probe the possibility of war crimes committed by American forces in Afghanistan, the U.S. government responded by sanctioning the ICC officials. This action reveals how a strong state can employ his political and economic influence to prevent any enforcement process against his compatriots, and this shows the two-sided standards that are frequently quoted by the opponents of the international law. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA): The Iran nuclear deal or the JCPOA was an international agreement that sought to ensure that Iran did not develop nuclear weapons. In 2018, the United States unilaterally pulled out of the pact and imposed sanctions back on Iran regardless of Iran remaining in compliance as certified by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This move undermined a major international law and diplomatic institution demonstrating the ability of one mighty state to undermine multilateral agreements due to non-compliance and economic pressure. These case studies reveal that the absence of a centralized enforcer, the principle of state sovereignty, and power imbalance imply that there are some major gaps in the enforceability of international law. Defenses and Alternative Mechanisms. With doubts, global standards stand up as essential. It is confirmed by reasons given by Breakers, where cutoff costs prevented entire mess. Swaps have high usual following. There are other instruments such as balanced replies, as in past asset holds. Better pushes are made with good inducements which are not harmful limits. Visionaries watch them carve loot gains, construct each other with evil. In diffusion power, the new connections may elevate the implementation but become divisive. Such tools as watch assist indirect push via reveal. Word maintenance sustains authority during breaks. Educational sections are sharp, disputes turn. Answer is supported by widening and reviews claim long-lasting via record. The weather changes can revive the efforts and movements can indicate changes. Bend is mixed using hard and soft bend rules. Contemporary Challenges Nowadays, the implementation of faces difficulties due to big breaks and unequal. Hurdles are caused by outs and contradictions. Scrutinies destroy actions, Examples are area lapses and swap lapses. Bifurcation of thins tools, competitors preferring picks. Prolonged enforcement struggles with watch. Opinions of drop are the results of misuses, but the experts concentrate politics on regulations. Nature befitting suits, interrogatives and falses. Advice has compelling obligations, which influence policies. These trends require new commitments to level off. Gray Zone Conflict and Law Legal Deterrence. Submerged aggressions employ the disrupts, which is an indirect method of by-passing triggers. Prevention through refusal implies broad techniques, criminalization and improved tracing to reduce costs. Cases: moves, sea says, meddles. This makes use of norms to junk charter stresses on direct pressure. Half-breeds confuse composedconfrontations, interrogatives. Response setups should be corrected on the non-usual acts. Part complexes are provided by digital parts, with link barriers. There are shared guard groups planned.

#### **Reforms and Future Stratagem**

Critical changes are necessary in dealing with gaps. In hard cases, blocks are curtailed by suggestions and parts by groups. Expands of papers that have variety, add show without rights. Lifting court reaches by must terms and complete joins implied. Money pushes stimulate obedience. Parallel bodies develop inclusion in spread set up. Routes are admixtures of kinds of rules, watch groups. The enforcement is driven by support, as in the real-world of areas. Reject with oppositional decision-making. To occult, new

connection and outcast. Shifts are made in the weather moves. Broad based shifts are in moves aimed on the whole work areas implying smooth processes and superior mixes. They might elevate in response of things such as motions or nature wrongs.

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